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MORE PROCESS THAN PEACE:
LEGITIMACY, COMPLIANCE, AND THE
OSLO ACCORDS

Orde F. Kittrie*
I SRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS: OSLO AND THE
LESSONS OF FAILURE - PERSPECTIVES, PREDICAMENTS AND
PROSPECTS. Edited by Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma'oz, and Khalil

TH E

Shikaki. Portland: Sussex Academic Press. 2002. Pp. xvii, 174. $67.50.

BREAKTHROUGH I NTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: How GREAT
NEGOTIATORS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD'S TOUGHEST POST-COLD
WAR CONFLICTS. A PUBLICATION OF THE PROGRAM ON
NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL. By Michael Watkins and

Susan Rosegrant. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 2001. Pp. xxii, 346. $40.

I NTRODUCTION

A. Overview
The 21st century has inherited a number of bloody and long
unresolved intranational conflicts,1 including those in Kashmir,
* The author, Orde F. Kittrie, is a Washington, D.C. attorney. B.A. 1986, Yale; J.D.
1992, University of Michigan. - Ed. The author of this Review wishes to thank the follow
ing for their helpful comments: Robert Dalton, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Af
fairs at the United States Department of State; Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director of the
Middle East Program at the United States Institute of Pea' ce; Joel Singer, the former Legal
Adviser to the Israeli Foreign Ministry; Emory University Professor Kenneth Stein, formerly
director of the Carter Center; and Debra Feuer. The views expressed herein are the author's
own, and not necessarily those of either his employer or the U.S. Government.

1. PEACE AND CONFLICT 2003: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF
DETERMINAT!ON MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) is a particularly useful survey of
the world's armed conflicts, both those which are intranational or "societal," and those
which are international. Published in January 2003 by the University of Maryland's Center
for International Development and Conflict Management, Peace and Conflict states that
there were twelve "ongoing major societal wars" at the end of 2002: Russia-Chechens, Co
lombia, Algeria, Israel-Palestinians, Nepal, India-Kashmiri Muslims, Philippines-Moro Mus
lims, Burundi-Hutus, Sudan-Southerners, Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast, and Liberia. Id. at
12. It lists eleven additional "societal wars [which] were experiencing sporadic outbursts of
violence at the end of 2002." Id. at 13. Interestingly, it also notes that "(t]he 1990 Iraq inva
sion of Kuwait and the subsequent 1991 U.S.-led Gulf War to expel the invaders is the only
ambiguous interstate war during the post-Cold War era." Id. (The report was published
before the beginning of the 2003 U.S.-Jed invasion of Iraq.)
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Northern Ireland, Burundi, Cyprus, Colombia, the Congo, the
Philippines, and the Holy Land.2 Negotiated . efforts to resolve these
conflicts through legally binding peace settlements have been
attempted from time to time, but without lasting success.
Numerous negotiators' memoirs, political science books, and histo
rians' tomes have been devoted to the subject of peace negotiations.
But relatively little has been written about peace negotiations from a
legal perspective. In particular, the legal literature contains virtually
no discussion of what in the contents of a bilateral peace agreement's
text can maximize the likelihood that the parties will comply with the
peace agreement's terms.
There is a recent body of international legal scholarship that seeks
to identify those characteristics of a multilateral agreement that can
enhance the likelihood that parties will comply with the agreement.
The primary focus of such international legal "compliance scholar
ship" has been on nonbinding agreements in "global issue" areas such
as environmental protection. This Review expands compliance schol
arship from the multilateral into the bilateral realm, and from global
issues into the regional-conflict arena.
The foremost bilateral peacemaking effort of the last decade has
been the attempt to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the
Oslo Peace Accords.3 Drawing from three key recent books, this
Review uses the Accords as a case study. From this case study, it
derives broader lessons about what in the contents of a bilateral peace
agreement's text can maximize, and what can diminish, the likelihood
that the parties will comply with the peace agreement's terms.

2. It is worth noting that most if not all of these protracted intranational conflicts are,
like the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, about "the redefinition of territory, state formation, or
control of the state" and are marked by ''long-standing animosities rooted in a perceived
threat to identity or survival." JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE
RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 8, 17 (1997). Lederach notes that in such conflicts,
"contested issues of substance (such as territory or governance) are intimately rooted in the
cultural and psychological elements driving and sustaining the conflict." Id. at 17. At the
same time, "the futures of those who are fighting are ultimately and intimately linked and
interdependent." Id. at 27. The similarities between these intranational conflicts mean that
lessons derived from the Oslo process seem especially likely to apply to peacemaking with
respect to the other intranational conflicts. This Review will, however, refer to "peacemak
ing" as opposed to "peacemaking with respect to intranational conflicts" because it is this
author's belief that the lessons this Review discusses are likely also to be applicable to proc
esses and mechanisms for resolving most armed conflicts between states.
3. The first agreement that the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization ("PLO") signed was the Arafat-Rabin exchange of mutual-recognition letters
on September 9, 1993. Four days later, on the White House lawn, they signed the Declara
tion of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("DOP"), which had been ne
gotiated and initialed in Oslo, Norway. The terms "Oslo Accords" or "Accords," as used in
this Review, includes the Arafat-Rabin letters of September 9, 1993, the DOP, and all sub
sequent written agreements between the Government of Israel and the PLO. The key such
agreements are listed in Part II of this Review.
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Drawing examples from the Accords, this Review will first survey
the broad range of valuable contributions that international law can
make to successful peace negotiations, and in particularly to the
drafting of a compliance-friendly, lasting peace agreement. These con
tributions include 1) supplying norms that can bind the peace negotia
tions and the resulting agreement, 2) offering dispute-resolution
mechanisms, 3) lending legitimacy to the process and to the text, and
4) providing building blocks for the construction of the peace process
and the final agreement. This Review will discuss why and how the
Oslo process and texts failed to take advantage of most of these poten
tial contributions.
The Review will then focus on the deleterious role of the two
methodological pillars on which the Oslo negotiators did attempt to
rely: a) "open-ended gradualism" and b) "constructive ambiguity". As
this Review will discuss, the Accords were "open-ended" in that they
left almost completely open the fundamental question of what the
permanent status agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians
would eventually entail. The Accords' framers instead relied on the
two parties gradually making concessions towards each other on the
assumption that over time confidence and trust would grow, making
difficult issues easier to resolve. The Accords' texts also contained a
considerable amount of "constructive ambiguity" - papering over
disagreements by using ambiguous phrases capable of being inter
preted by each of the parties in a manner protective of their own
interests or positions.
The Review will discuss why the drafters of the Oslo Accords
chose to rely so heavily on open-ended gradualism and ambiguity in
their efforts to turn peace negotiations into a legally binding, final
settlement. It will then analyze how and why this reliance proved to be
disastrously counterproductive. The Review concludes with a discus
sion of lessons learned, including lessons specifically applicable to
future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and lessons generally applica
ble to designing peace negotiations, and peace agreement texts to
maximize compliance with their te'rins.
B.

Introduction to the Literature

The columnist Charles Krauthammer has memorably summarized
the lessons he and many others draw from the bloody state of the Oslo
peace process:
The great divide in American foreign policy thinking is between those
who believe in paper and those who believe in power. The paper school
was in charge of the 1990s. . . . The bloodiest farce was the Oslo
'peace' . . . . Living by paper - contracts and laws and courts and binding
agreements - is lovely. It's what makes domestic society civilized and
decent. The problem is that the international arena is not domestic soci-
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ety. It is a jungle . . . . Laboring over every jot and tittle - the life work of
our paper-pushing peace processors - is quite mad. The beginning of
wisdom is giving up this supremely na"ive belief in paper.4

Krauthammer's are not words that international lawyers - who
make a living laboring over international agreements - like to hear.
Are Krauthammer and those who share his skepticism of peace
agreements right? By now, more than ten years after the signing of the
first Oslo Accord, much has been written about the political dynamics
that contributed to Oslo's failure. As Part III of this Review discusses,
there is a strong argument that the Oslo Accords were ultimately
doomed to failure by Yasser Arafat's fundamental unwillingness to
end the conflict with Israel. But is the futility of peace agreements with
Yasser Arafat the only lesson to be learned from the failure of the
Oslo Accords? Does careful scrutiny reveal that there are also struc
tural reasons why the Oslo Accords brought more process than peace?
Were there flaws in the design of the agreements that also discouraged
the parties from complying with them? What important lessons that
are applicable to other conflicts can be learned from Oslo? How can
we maximize the ability of international law and international agree
ments to be useful tools for making peace in the international jungle?
How can we use them to build sustainable processes and mechanisms
capable of helping transform conflict into peace and reconciliation?
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons
of Failure ("Lessons of Failure") and Breakthrough International
Negotiation ("Breakthrough") provide a useful starting point for in
quiring into these critical questions.
Lessons of Failure is thoughtfully edited by Robert L. Rothstein
(an American who is the Harvey Picker Professor of International
Relations at Colgate University), Moshe Ma'oz (an Israeli who is
Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem), and Khalil Shikaki (a Palestinian who is an Associate
Professor of Political Science at Bir Zeit University). It presents a
broad range of political perspectives on the Oslo process, from left
wing Israelis to an lslamist Palestinian who describes how "the very
existence of 'Israel' is considered illegal" from an "Islamic point of
view."5 The book makes for interesting reading, partly because each
one of the commentators has a different view of what the Accords re
quired and what the best way is to move forward. As this Review dis
cusses, commentators across the spectrum, including those presented
in f.-essons of Failure, do seem to agree on one very interesting thing:
that at least part of the reason the Oslo process failed lies with the

4. Charles Krauthammer, The Clinton Paper Chase, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2002, at A29.
5. Mustafa Abu Sway, Islamic Perspectives on the Oslo Process, in LESSONS OF
FAILURE, p. 86.
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structure and text of the Accords themselves, and especially their reli
ance on open-ended gradualism and constructive ambiguity.
Breakthrough was written by two Harvard faculty members,
Michael Watkins6 and Susan Rosegrant,7 under the auspices of the
Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. It intersperses chap
ters on international negotiation theory with chapters applying those
theories to four major recent, international negotiations, including the
Oslo process. The Oslo-specific chapters, as well as the chapters of
general international negotiation theory, facilitate an analysis of Oslo
in light of the latest theoretical wisdom about international negotia
tions.
As resources for determining Oslo's lessons, the political science
perspectives of Lessons of Failure and the negotiating theory perspec
tives of Breakthrough are nicely complemented by The Oslo Accords:
International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements8 ("Oslo
& International Law"), by Geoffrey R. Watson. Watson is a professor
of law at Catholic University of America. Watson's is the rare book
that approaches a peace negotiation from an international legal per
spective. Oslo & International Law deftly parses the Accords' specific
terms and assesses them in the context of broader international legal
principles as well as other international agreements. Oslo &
International Law is organized as answers to four major legal ques
tions about the Oslo process: whether the Accords are legally binding;
to what extent each side has complied with its obligations under the
Accords; what effect violations have on each of the parties' outstand
ing obligations; and how international law can help shape a final
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.9 Together, Lessons of
Failure, Breakthrough, and Oslo & International Law provide valuable
insight into why the Palestinians and the Israelis failed to comply with
the Oslo Accords, what negotiating and drafting improvements could
have maximized compliance with the Accords, and what contributions
paper documents and indeed international law can make to the resolu
tion of conflicts in the international jungle.
Unfortunately, despite the excellent raw material they provide,
none of these books has an organizational structure or analytical
scheme that is particularly helpful for systematically assessing where
the Oslo process failed in its use of international law to negotiate and
create a sustainable peace. Each chapter of Lessons of Failure is writ
ten by a different analyst; almost without exception, the chapters con6. Associate Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School.
7. Faculty Member, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
8. GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2000).
9. Id. at vii.
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sist of that analyst's enumeration of all the key factors which he or she
believes contributed to Oslo's failure. Breakthrough provides an out
standing overview of relevant negotiations theory, and very useful
insight into how the Israelis and Palestinians were coaxed into reach
ing their first agreement in Oslo. But it contains almost no analysis of
how the methods used to coax them at the beginning - including
ambiguity, gradualism, and open-endedness - may have contributed
to the eventual failure of the process begun at Oslo. The questions
that Oslo & International Law addresses are important, and it is a
generally superb book. But, as this Review will discuss, the book pro
vides an inadequate, and indeed in many ways incorrect, assessment of
what changes to the Oslo Accords could have maximized, and what in
the Accords tended to diminish, the likelihood that the parties would
comply with the Accords' terms.
Rather than summarizing and analyzing each of these books in
turn, this Review instead draws from them to assess systematically the
Oslo process's use of international law to negotiate and create a
sustainable peace. In examining the interplay between peacemaking,
negotiations theory and practice, and international law, this Review
ventures into relatively uncharted territory. As Kenneth W. Stein and
Samuel W. Lewis pointed out ill their pre-Oslo book, Making Peace
Among Arabs and Israelis: Lessons from Fifty Years of Negotiating
Experience ("Making Peace"), "lessons from the history of U.S.-Arab
lsraeli negotiations have rarely if ever been extracted and systemati
cally applied."10 This gap in the literature is not limited to peace nego
tiations between Arabs and Israelis. Remarkably little has been writ
ten about how bilateral international agreements in general can be
designed so as to maximize the likelihood that parties will comply with
them.1 1 This is especially true of peace agreements, which some might
consider as the most important and challenging form of bilateral
international agreements. Indeed, Richard B . Bilder's 1981 book,
Managing the Risks of International Agreement, stands practically
alone in serving as a practical guide to maximizing compliance with
bilateral international agreements of any type.
The lack of scholarship on using international law to negotiate and
create sustainable peace processes and agreements is particularly
notable with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While that
conflict "has been waged primarily on political and military battle
grounds . . . a legal war has also raged on paper, and it has been as
hard-fought as any of the Arab-Israeli wars."12 Even though the
1 0. KENNETH W. STEIN & SAMUEL W. LEWIS, MAKING PEACE AMONG ARABS AND
ISRAELIS: LESSONS FROM FIFrY YEARS OF NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE ix (1991).
11. Interview with Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, United
States Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 2003).
12. WATSON, supra note 8, at 1.
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict has manifested itself most saliently as a
bloody struggle waged using bombs and bullets, both sides have,
throughout the conflict, looked to international law to provide both
justifications for their actions, and potential means of resolving their
conflict.
I.

THE OSLO ACCORDS

A. Introduction to the Accords
The Arafat-Rabin exchange of mutual-recognition letters, signed
on September 9, 1993, was the first of the Oslo Accords. In his letter,
Yasser Arafat, in his capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, confirmed that the PLO: "recognizes the right of the
State of Israel to exist in peace and security;" "commits itself to . . . a
peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares
that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved
through negotiations;" and "renounces the use of terrorism and other
acts of violence. "13 Yitzhak Rabin, in his capacity as Prime Minister of
Israel, replied to Arafat's letter with a letter in which Rabin confirmed
that "in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the
Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the repre
sentative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with
the PLO within the Middle East peace process."14
Four days later, on September 13, 1993, the DOP was signed on
the White House lawn. In the preamble, the Government of Israel and
the PLO declared it their goal to "put an end to decades of confronta
tion and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights,
and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and secu
rity and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement
and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process."15
The DOP was succeeded by the following major agreements be
tween Israel and the PLO: the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area, signed on May 4, 1994;16 the Agreement on Preparatory
Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, signed on August 29, 1994;17
the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the

13. Letter from Arafat to Rabin (Sept. 9, 1993), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at
315.
14. Id. at 316.
15. DOP Preamble (Sept. 13, 1993), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 317-27.
16. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (May 4, 1994), reprinted in
WATSON, supra note 8, at 328-39.
1 7. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Aug. 29, 1994),
reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 340-48.
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Gaza Strip, signed on September 28, 1995;18 the Protocol Concerning
the Redeployment in Hebron, signed January 15, 1997;19 the Wye
River Memorandum, signed on October 23, 1998;20 and the Sharm
el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding
Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of
Permanent Status Negotiations, signed on September 4, 1999.21 Some
of these agreements included attachments, such as annexes, maps,
agreed minutes, notes for the record, and the like. In total, the Oslo
Accords add up to some one thousand pieces of paper.22
The Oslo Accords provided for a five year transition period to
begin with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area,
and to end with a "permanent settlement." Permanent-status negotia
tions were to "commence as soon as possible, but not later than the
beginning of the third year of the interim period."23 The transitional
period began on May 4, 1994 and was to conclude on May 4, 1999.
Although permanent-status negotiations did take place, including
those at Camp David in July 2000, no permanent settlement was
reached.
The Oslo Accords were largely, if not entirely, a failure. The basic
criterion for evaluating the value of any diplomatic instrument is the
degree to which it helped to achieve its declared objective. In this
instance, the declared objective was a "just, lasting and comprehensive
peace settlement and historic reconciliation."24 By mid-2003, the
decade since the September 1993 signing on the White House lawn
had seen the renewal of the Palestinian terrorist campaign against
Israel, hundreds of dead on both sides, the reoccupation of most of the
West Bank, enormous damage to both the Israeli and Palestinian
economies, and the missing of practically every Oslo deadline. Dennis
Ross, the Special Middle East Coordinator who was the lead Ameri
can negotiator with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict during the
Clinton Administration, wrote as follows at the end of 2002:
In my 20 years involved in Middle East diplomacy, there have been many
times when the effort toward peace appeared futile to the parties
1 8. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Sept.
28, 1 995), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 349-68.
19. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (Jan. 15, 1997), reprinted in
WATSON, supra note 8, at 369-74.
20. Wye River Memorandum (Oct. 23, 1998), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at
377-84.
21. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (Sept. 4, 1999), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8,
at 385-89.
22. See, e.g.. AHARON KLEIMAN, CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY IN MIDDLE EAST
PEACE-MAKING 57 (1999).
23. DOP Article V, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 318.
24. DOP Preamble, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 317.
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involved. But none of those times had the ring of hopelessness that I see
in the region today. It is clear that Israelis, after two years of violence,
believe they have no partner for peace among the Palestinians. For their
part, Palestinians question whether the current Israeli government has
any plan other than to try to extinguish their aspirations through force.25

In mid 2003, there was some hope that in the wake of Gulf War II,
the Road Map process might succeed in picking up the pieces of Oslo
and moving the parties toward peace. Such an effort to pick up Oslo's
pieces makes it even more important to try to understand why Oslo
fell apart in the first place.
Many people believe that Oslo was doomed to failure because the
Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, was unwilling to make peace with
Israel on any terms. This Review will briefly examine that possibility
and its implications. But the Review will argue that, whether or not
this was the case, major methodological flaws in the structure and text
of the Oslo Accords also stood in the way of peace. In the course of
this analysis, this Review will not focus on the substance of the
Accords, or of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole. It will focus
instead on the legal processes and methodologies used to build the
Accords, and on what the failure of these methodologies meant for the
outcome of the Accords.
B.

Introduction to the Methodology of the Accords

Negotiation theory focuses on the critical role of process and
methodology in determining the success of conflict resolution efforts
(p. xiv). Drawing heavily on the classics in the field of conflict resolu
tion, Breakthrough notes that, "Skilled negotiators think hard about
the impact of process on perceptions of interests and alternatives, on
the part of their counterparts and those they represent, and on their
own side. Then they work to fashion - often to negotiate - processes
likely to lead in favorable directions" (p. xviii).
Part of what makes the Oslo Accords especially interesting from a
methodological perspective is that they took an unusual - some have
said "uniquely structured"26 - approach to trying to achieve their
desired outcome. Joel Singer, the attorney who joined the Israeli team
in Oslo and continued to serve as Israel's lawyer for the first several
years of the Oslo process (including as the Legal Adviser to Israel's
Foreign Ministry), has characterized this unusual approach as follows:
Usually . . . you agree on a general framework that includes the basic
agreement of the parties on the fundamental elements of their dispute,
leaving for later agreements all the details of the implementation of the
25. Dennis Ross, Mapping Out Peace in the Mideast, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at B15.
26. Joel Singer, Capitol Hill Briefing (Sept. 14, 1997), LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal
News Service File.
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basic framework agreement. The Oslo Agreement was uniquely struc
tured in a reverse manner. It is full of details regarding the day to day
administration of a five year transitional period, leaving open for a later
agreement the most important question of the ultimate settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute.27

Aaron Miller, the Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator during the
Clinton Administration, has described the reason for this "reverse" of
the normal methodological approach as follows: "The logic of Oslo
was to defer for now issues that could not be resolved on the assump
tion that over time confidence and trust . . . would grow so that even
while [an issue such as] Jerusalem could not be resolved in 1993, a
solution could be worked out later."28
"Traditional bargain theory" requires "a contract that provides for
all contingencies and comprehensively specifies [all the details] of per
formance. "29 By contrast, the Israelis and Palestinians developed at
Oslo a declaration of principles that purposefully "guaranteed nothing
about whether or how the central substantive issues would be re
solved. "30 Instead, the DOP and its follow-on agreements created a le
gally structured process designed to build trust. Central, substantive
issues were to be tackled once trust had thus been built.
Four specific methodologies characterized Oslo's trust-building
process: 1) open-ended gradualism, 2) constructive ambiguity, 3) bilat
eralism, and 4) reciprocity.31 As Terje Roed-Larsen, the Norwegian
impresario of the Oslo talks, pointed out in an article on the ninth
anniversary of the secret initialing of the DOP in Oslo, "the Oslo
process used a few key tactics. One was gradualism - solving what
was solvable, moving gradually forward and building trust along the
way. Another was bilateralism - Israelis and Palestinians negotiated
directly, with third party roles often confined to facilitation. "32 "Bilat
eralism" can be defined as a focus on direct negotiations between the
parties, with minimum reliance on third-party mediation. "Construc
tive ambiguity" means the deliberate use of vague, equivocal, or
ambiguous language capable of being interpreted by each party as
protecting its own interests. "Reciprocity" is an emphasis on each
27. Id.
28. Aaron Miller, The Pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian Peace: A Retrospective, in LESSONS
OF FAILURE, p. 34.
29. Juliet P. Kpstritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A
Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 623 (1993).
30. Robert L. Rothstein, A Fragile Peace: Are There Only Lessons of Failure?, in
LESSONS OF FAILURE, p. 163 [hereinafter Rothstein, Are There Only Lessons].
31. This Reviewer's definitions of "open-ended gradualism" and "constructive ambigu
ity" in the Oslo context are set forth in detail in the following Parts and Sections of this Re
view: Overview; IV. Open-Ended Gradualism; and V. Constructive Ambiguity.
32. Terje Roed-Larsen, This Time the World Has to Act, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 20,
2002, at 6.
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party's performance being conditioned on the other party's perform
ance. 33 Larsen has characterized such confidence-building approaches
as a special "kind of diplomacy . . . the spirit of Oslo," a diplomacy
emphasizing "the necessity of building . . . confidence" and overcom
ing "lack of trust. "34
Professor Watson, in the conclusion of Oslo & International Law,
refers to the positive value of these four methodologies as part of the
"broader lessons" that the Oslo Accords "teach . . . about the peaceful
settlement of disputes."35 Watson posits "the value of vagueness
and ambiguity,"36 "the value of gradualism,"37 "the importance of
reciprocity,"38 and the "lesson . . . that not every regional conflict re
quires mediation."39 Drawing in large part on Lessons of Failure,
Breakthrough, and Oslo & International Law, but at times also on
other sources, this Review focuses mainly on two of these particular
methodologies of the Oslo process - open-ended gradualism and
ambiguity. It argues that among the most salient lessons of Oslo is the
counterproductiveness of relying on open-ended gradualism and
ambiguity as key elements of a peace process and agreement.
International law can make several valuable types of contributions
to a peace process. As this Review will discuss, the Accords' framers
did not avail themselves of most of these potential positive contribu
tions. That failure meant the Accords were, from the beginning,
weaker than they could have been. The damage done by the Oslo
Accords' misreliance on open-ended gradualism and ambiguity was
particularly significant in part because of that congenital weakness. .
The next Part of this Review surveys the broad range of valuable
contributions that international law can make to peacemaking and dis
cusses why and how the Oslo Accords failed to take advantage of most
of them. Subsequent Parts focus on the reasons the negotiations relied
heavily on open-ended gradualism and ambiguity, and the disastrous
results of that reliance.
II.

P EACEMAKING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

" [I]nternational law can help bring about the dream of peace,"40
writes Catholic University's Professor Watson in the preface to Oslo
33. See WATSON, supra note 8, at 308-10.
34. Oslo Plus Five - The Spirit of Oslo: Interview with Ambassador Terje Roed Larsen,
MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT, Nov. 1991, at 1, 2.
35. WATSON, supra note 8, at 309.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 310.
40. Id. at x.
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& International Law. International law's potential contributions to
negotiating peace can be categorized as follows: 1) supplying norms
that can bound the peace process (including interim agreements) and
the resulting permanent status agreement; 2) offering mechanisms for
resolving disputes between the parties; 3) increasing the likelihood of
day to day compliance with interim or permanent agreements by
lending legitimacy to the process and the texts; and 4) providing
building blocks for constructing the peace process and the final
agreement.

A. Bounding Norms
Oslo & International Law is largely about the interaction between
the Oslo process and Accords and the international legal norms that
might be relevant to bounding that process and a permanent status
agreement. Watson reviews not only specific legal requirements, such
as the potential applicability to Israeli settlement-building of particu
lar provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War,41 but also general procedural norms
of international law, such as the duty to interpret and perform obliga
tions in good faith, which he calls " [a] fundamental principle of treaty
law" that is "declarat[ive] of customary international law."42 Oslo &
International Law is so thorough and thoughtful that it provides an es
sential guide not just to the Oslo Accords and their implementation
but indeed to all the key international legal norm issues that have
arisen with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But Watson does
not disguise his skepticism about the practical value of international
legal norms, whatever their level of specificity, to Israeli-Palestinian
peacemaking. For example, in discussing Palestinian claims to a right
of self-determination, he concludes that "the content of the right of
self-determination is indeterminate," that "variegated practice might
lead one to conclude that there is no meaningful right of
self-determination at all," and that self-determination is clearly "not a
fixed norm that points to only one solution."43
With respect to the pivotal question of Jerusalem, Professor
Watson notes that " [t]here are few questions in international law that
evoke a stronger emotional response than" the question of " [w]hat is
the status of Jerusalem, and who is entitled to territorial sovereignty
there?"44 Then he says that "[i]f the negotiators wish to make any

41. Id. at 1 36-42.
42. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 270-72.
44. Id. at 267.
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progress, they will not answer it."45 Because " [n]o arbitral tribunal will
ever resolve this dispute," says Watson, "in one sense an assessment of
the competing claims is pointless: plainly the only way out of the log
jam is some negotiated compromise."46 The negotiators' goal, says
Watson, "should be to supplant the existing arguments about
Jerusalem with a new legal regime that is binding on, and generally
acceptable to, all parties."47 " [T]he important task," he says, "is to cre
ate new law."48 In other words, to use legal building blocks to con
struct processes and agreements solidifying the results of the parties'
negotiations.
B.

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

International law offers numerous, formal mechanisms for resolv
ing disputes between the parties to an agreement. In the Accords, the
Palestinian Authority ("PA")/PLO and Israel specifically listed
several such formal international dispute resolution mechanisms,
including conciliation and arbitration, as options to which they could
turn for resolving disputes.49 But they never chose to avail themselves
of these mechanisms. Other provisions of the Accords required the
parties to avail themselves of specific dispute resolution mechanisms
in certain circumstances. For example, Article XV of the DOP man
dates that " [d]isputes arising out of the application or interpretation of
the DOP, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim pe
riod, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison
Committee."50 But the parties also failed to make use of these
required dispute resolution mechanisms. Instead, in dispute after
dispute, both the PA/PLO and Israel "ignored the dispute-resolution
provisions of the Oslo Accords and of general treaty law."51
Watson suggests that Israel and the Palestinians may have been
wary of formal dispute resolution mechanisms in part because neither
party was prepared to call into question the continued vitality of the
Accords by formally accusing the other of a "material breach," and
international law is very unclear as to what principles apply in the
circumstance of a "minor breach. "52 For whatever the reason, includ
ing perhaps this gap in international law, the dispute resolution
45. Id.
46. Id. at 268.
47. Id. at 267.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., DOP Article XV, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 321.
50. WATSON, supra note 8, at 321 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 217; see also id. at 120-21, 210.
52. Id. at 309-10.
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mechanisms made available by international law played virtually no
role in the Oslo process.
C.

Legitimacy and Compliance

Legitimacy, the factor which noncoercively encourages compliance
with laws both domestic and international, was compellingly described
by the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.53
The Casey Court observed that " [t]he Court's power lies . . . in its
legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in
the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the
Nation's law means and to declare what it demands."54 Legitimacy is
"the source of this Court's authority" because "except to a minor
degree, [the Court] cannot independently coerce obedience to its
decrees. "55 Having thus summarized legitimacy's meaning and signifi
cance, the Court went on to discuss "the conditions necessary for
its preservation."56 For the Court, its legitimacy - the factor which
noncoercively encourages compliance with its rulings - is not a static
reflection of the Court's place in the Constitution, but rather some
thing which must be tended to, preserved, and, if possible, enhanced.
The Court places great importance on nurturing its legitimacy even
though compliance with the Court's decisions is now solidly grounded
in over two hundred years of American history, tradition, theory, and
practice.
Legitimacy maximization is comparatively even more valuable for
encouraging compliance with agreements in the "international
jungle." Professor Thomas Franck's seminal The Power of Legitimacy
Among Nations is undoubtedly the foremost book on legitimacy and
international law. In it, Franck observes that many "international rules
of conduct are habitually obeyed by states,"57 even in the absence of a
global sovereign "with a supranational police force."58 Franck's book
endeavors to answer the question of why "international rules" (his
term for international laws) "are mostly obeyed" even though they
"usually are not enforced."59 Franck posits that the answer lies in
legitimacy, "the non-coercive factor, or bundle of factors, predisposing
toward voluntary obedience. " 6° Franck speculates that those "texts
53. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
54. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 20 (1990).
58. Id. at 22.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 16.
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which are rarely obeyed are obeyed rarely because - or in part
because - they, or the institutions which generated them, do not
appear legitimate . . . some, or most, of the time."61
Franck's investigation of which attributes lend legitimacy to inter
national rules is extremely helpful for ·understanding why the Oslo
Accords were not more often "obeyed." There is, at least thus far, no
world policeman to force the PA/PLO and Israel to abide by the terms
to which they agreed in the Oslo Accords, and the parties have proven
themselves unable to forcibly coerce each other into abiding by those
terms. In the absence of such coercive enforcement, the parties'
willingness to obey the Oslo Accords - and each of the Accords'
discrete provisions - would, per Franck's analysis, depend on the par
ties' initial and continuing perception of the Accords' , and discrete
provisions', legitimacy.
Two threshold questions regarding the Oslo Accords, and any
legitimacy that their legal status can, or could, have lent them are, of
course, whether the Accords were legally binding when signed and
whether they continue to be in force. Professor Watson in Oslo &
International Law finds that the Oslo Accords "do not fit the tradi
tional definition of a treaty, which is an agreement between nation
states, "62 because neither the PLO nor the PA has ever met the tradi
tional international legal test of statehood.63 Watson notes that the
"counterintuitive conclusion" that "the Oslo Accords are probably
not treaties under traditional treaty law, as embodied in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties . . . says something about the nar
row scope of the Vienna Convention and, more generally, about the
formalism that pervades international law."64
Watson concludes, however, that the Accords are nonetheless "le
gally binding as agreements between subjects of international law."65 In
reaching this conclusion, Watson relies in part on Article 3 of the
Vienna Convention, which provides: "The fact that the present
Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded be
tween States and other subjects of international law . . . shall not
affect . . . [t]he legal force of such agreements . . . ."66 In other words,
says Watson, "the modern customary law of international agreements
is broader than the Vienna Convention,"67 and "agreements involving
61. Id.
62. WATSON, supra note 8, at vii (emphasis added).
63. See id. at 60, 63, 71 .
64. Id. at 74.
65. Id. at vii (emphasis added).
66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. I II, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 333-34.
67. WATSON, supra note 8, at 74.
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'other subjects of international law' may be binding under the custom
ary law of treaties, even if they are not binding under the Vienna
Convention itself."68 He then points to the phrasing of the Accords,69
subsequent practice of the parties,70 and various precedents for bind
ing agreements between states and sub-state entities71 to solidify his
conclusion that the Oslo Accords are examples of such binding
agreements between states and other "subject[s] of international
law."72
Watson's detailed defense of his conclusion that the Accords are
binding is necessary because the question of the Accords' binding ef
fect, like so much in the Accords themselves, is somewhat ambiguous.
Watson devotes several pages to rival theories that have been
propounded on this issue, including that the Accords are "quasi
binding 'soft law' "73 and that "the Oslo Accords are utterly non
binding instruments that have no legal consequence whatsoever."74
According to Watson, " [e]ven the United States, one of the principal
facilitators of the peace process, has stepped lightly around the ques
tion of the legal status of the Oslo Accords."75
For Watson, the importance of the Oslo Accords being considered
legally binding lies at least in part in the added legitimacy that seems
to be ascribed to legally binding documents. Parties, he says, "tend to
regard legal obligations more seriously than non-legal ones."76 If Israel
and the Palestinians have in the Oslo Accords "signed binding com
mitments, then the international community as well as the parties
themselves may expect a higher degree of fidelity to the agreements
than if they are non-binding policy papers."77
68. Id. at 58.
69. See id. at 56, 101.
70. See id. at 76.
71. See, e.g. , id. at 92-99.
72. See, e.g. , id. at 91-92.
73. See id. at 82.
74. Id. at 83.
75. Id. at 80. It is worth noting, however, that the normally encyclopedic Watson pro
vides relatively little support for this assessment of the U.S. position, citing only a single
draft letter from then Secretary of State Christopher to the Prime Minister of Israel at the
time, Benjamin Netanyahu. Id.
76. Id. at vii. As Professor Louis Henkin notes, "Nations observe law, in part, for what
may be called 'psychological' reasons. There is an influence for law observance in the very
quality of law, in the sense of obligation which it implies." LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE 56 (1 968). "That a nation consented to an obligation," says Henkin, "inevitably
generates some influence for its observance." Id. "Psychological" reasons for compliance
may, as Lederach posits, be particularly important in intranational conflicts, in which the
enemy is closer at hand and the animosities are often more intensely felt and of longer
standing. LEDERACH, supra note 2, at 17.
77. WATSON, supra note 8, at 55.
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The perceived legitimacy of a process and agreement is, of course,
affected not only by whether the agreement itself is legally binding,
but also by various elements of the process and text.78 The Oslo
Accords failed to bring peace partly because key elements of their de
sign caused the Accords to lose rather than gain legitimacy as time
passed.
In The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Franck examines "the
structure of rule texts themselves for evidence of literary properties
which appear to exert a pull in the direction of voluntary compli
ance. "79 He concludes that " [t]he pre-eminent literary property af
fecting legitimacy is the rule text's determinacy: that which makes its
message clear." 80 He notes that " [t]he same quality may also be
termed its 'transparency.' " 8 1 Franck gives several reasons why
determinacy is so critical to legitimacy. He begins with the basic fact
that "states or persons to whose conduct the rule is directed will know
more precisely what is expected of them, which is a necessary first step
towards compliance. " 82 He also notes that "indeterminacy . . . makes it
easier to justify non-compliance" 83 by rendering the provision in ques
tion so "malleable" that it is open to being twisted to mean something
far from what it was originally intended to mean. 84
Franck's seminal work on legitimacy is one of several key works
containing useful insights into how to foster compliance85 with interna
tional legal instruments. Franck's book was preceded by Louis
78. That is why some provisions of binding agreements are complied with more regular
ity than others. In legal scholarship, this is reflected in the several books which have been
written on compliance with nonbinding accords. See, e.g., COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE:
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah
Shelton ed., 2000); INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith
Brown Weiss ed., 1997).
79. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 52.
80. Id.; see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 10
(1995) (stating "ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language" is one of the key reasons
lying "at the root of' treaty-violating behavior).
81. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 52.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 54.
84. Id. at 54; see id. at 54-57.
85. "Compliance" analysis looks to whether and why states actually abide by their pro
cedural and substantive international obligations. Peter M. Haas writes that "[c]ompliance
refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the provision of the accord and to the imple
menting measures that they have instituted." Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, or Some
Hypotheses in Search of An Analyst, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING
ACCORDS 2 1 , supra note 78 [hereinafter Haas, Why Comply] . "[C)ompliance scholars," ex
plains Professor Alvarez, "are hoping to identify which characteristics of the actors involved
in an activity, the international environment, or the instrument involved (such as a treaty)
have an impact on the likelihood that any international norm will be given effect." Jose E.
Alvarez, Foreword: Why Nations Behave, 1 9 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 305 ( 1998).
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Henkin's important How Nations Behave and has been followed by
other important works on the subject. 86 Interestingly, all or almost all
of these works explicitly focus on compliance with multilateral, rather
than bilateral, regimes. This is a major gap in the literature.
A review of the existing literature reveals that many of the factors
that scholars have identified as creating a pull towards compliance
with multilateral regimes were entirely absent from the Oslo Accords,
or nearly so. Several of these compliance-pull factors seem generally
less likely to be as present in bilateral regimes as in multilateral, 87 a
proposition surely worth future investigation. There is, however, little
doubt about the absence of many of them from the Oslo Accords.
Some of these compliance-pull factors were inevitably less present in
the Oslo Accords than they might be in other bilateral, or certainly
multilateral, agreements, because of the parties' histories, their respec
tive places in the international community, and the particular nature
of their conflict. Other compliance-pull factors were less present in the
Oslo Accords because of the specific design of the Accords, and
particularly their misplaced reliance on open-ended gradualism and
ambiguity.
One compliance-pull factor that Franck discusses is the phenome
non of parties choosing to obey a rule, despite the fact that violating it
would bring certain short-term gains, because they expect that their
"long-term benefits from the future operation of the same norm" will
outweigh the short-term gains. 88 Thus, for example, a country might
respect an errant diplomat's immunity today in part because it wants
its own diplomats to be protected by that very same norm tomorrow.
This potentially beneficial phenomenon is less applicable to the Oslo
Accords because under Oslo - unlike with most international agree
ments - the obligations which the two parties undertook are in most
cases very different. The key Israeli commitments involve redeploy
ment while the key Palestinian commitments involve cracking down
86. The field is nonetheless apparently still in its infancy. As Peter M. Haas put it,
"Questions of compliance - to what extent states comply, which states are likely to comply,
what patterns of compliance exist within and across areas of regulation - have not been ex
tensively investigated and remain poorly understood." Peter M. Haas, Choosing to Comply:
Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Politics, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 64, supra note 78 [hereinafter Haas, Choosing to Comply].
87. As the following discussion implies, there are a number of reasons why this is the
case, including that agreements adhered to by multiple parties may more readily be per
ceived as legitimate, that such agreements can bring to bear compliance pressure from a
larger number of parties with "full standing" to apply such pressure, and that multilateral
agreements often have managing entities, which, like domestic judges, can provide legitimate
interpretations of nom1s and create "an interactive, dialectic process of justificatory
discourse, in which norms are invoked, interpreted, and elaborated in a way that generates
pressure for compliance." Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2638 (1997).
88. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 57.
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on terrorism. Thus, for example, because the Palestinians know there
is no terrorism crackdown provision that they will need to hold the Is
raelis to, they have no incentive to broadly interpret and vigorously
adhere to the crackdown provisions today so that they can insist
tomorrow that the Israelis operate on the · basis of the same broad,
vigorous interpretation of that same norm.89
Franck also posits that "[a] rule with low textual determinacy," i.e.
a rule that is ambiguous, may gain legitimacy "if it is open to a process
of clarification by an authority recognized as legitimate by those to
whom the rule is addressed."9° For example, the U.S. Supreme Court
is accepted as the definitive interpreter of the people's rights under the
U.S. Constitution. In contrast, as has been discussed above, the parties
to the Accords failed to institute a definitive mechanism or mecha
nisms for resolving disputes as to what the Accords' texts required of
them. The lack of such an authoritative mechanism meant that the
Accords could not benefit from clarification by a legitimate authority
as a means for enhancing the texts' determinacy and legitimacy.
The Oslo Accords also did not specify the costs or consequences of
violations. In How Nations Behave, Louis Henkin mentions that some
international agreements contain provisions that "make explicit the
cost or consequences of a violation. " He notes that " [w]hile usually
the principal purpose of such provisions is to render response more
nearly certain and violation therefore prohibitive, definition in
advance may also serve to limit the response and thus avoid excessive
reaction, counter-retaliation, and the breakdown of the treaty
system. "91 Thus the lack of Oslo Accords provisions specifying the cost
or consequences of violations may have contributed both to the
Accords' failure to deter violations, and to the spiral of increasingly
violent reactions and counter-reactions that violations triggered.
The Oslo Accords also failed to foster the creation of vested mate
rial interests in compliance. Many international agreements create
their "own bureaucracy with vested interests in compliance."92 The
Oslo Accords did not. Nor did they give "powerful domestic groups"
strong material interests "in maintaining these agreements."93 Business
interests tend to value economically oriented provisions, and provi89. Louis Henkin in How NATIONS BEHAVE 51 (1968) gives a reciprocal reason for why
"laws or obligations that operate symmetrically between nations . . . are rarely violated."
"(T]hat a nation has itself invoked a rule," says Henkin, "builds commitment to that rule
when it is, in turn, invoked by others." Id. at 56.
90. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 61.
91 . HENKIN, supra note 89, at 52.
92. Id. at 57.
93. Id. at 58. Peter M. Haas, in Why Comply, refers to the phenomenon as "the mobili
zation of domestic interests that anticipate material gain from compliance." Haas, Why
Comply, supra note 85, at 27-28.
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sions that create stability and predictability. B ut there was not a sig
nificant economic component to the Accords. Moreover, their
open-endedness and gradualism, which will be discussed in Part IV of
this Review, did not contribute to but rather undercut any ability to
predict what the situation would look like either after each stage of
the interim period or after a permanent-status agreement.
In his influential essay entitled Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, Harold Koh divides the contemporary literature regarding
compliance with international law into four conceptual strands. One
he calls a "rationalistic instrumentalist strand that views international
rules as instruments whereby states seek to attain their interests in
wealth, power, and the like."94 Koh notes that
international relations scholars such as Robert Keohane, Duncan Snidal,
and Oran Young, and legal scholars such as Kenneth Abbott and John
Setear, have applied increasingly sophisticated techniques of rational
choice theory to argue that nation-states obey international law when it
serves their short or long term self-interest to do so.95

"Under this rationalistic account, pitched at the level of the interna
tional system," says Koh, "nations employ cooperative strategies to
pursue a complex, multifaceted long-run national interest, in which
compliance with negotiated legal norms serves as a winning long-term
strategy."96 Under the logic of this approach, the compliance-pull of
the Oslo process was relatively weak for at least two reasons. First, the
lack of clarity as to the nature of the permanent status towards which
the process was leading weakened the Accords' compliance-pull as a
specific "instrument" for attaining "wealth" and "power." Second, the
relative isolation of the Israelis and the Palestinians from the interna
tional community, each for different reasons,97 left them less con
cerned about further exclusion for failure to "employ cooperative
strategies." It also may have made the two parties skeptical that their
contributing to the strength of the international system by complying
with its norms would result in their either 1) being substantively re
warded by the international community or 2) otherwise benefiting
from the system's increased vitality. Having relatively less faith and
investment in the international system, the parties were less subject to

94. Koh, supra note 87, at 2632.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. For example, Israel remains the only United Nations member not fully part of a re
gional grouping and has thus never served on the Security Council and has almost never
been selected to serve on other commissions and the like. Israel also views the United
Nations system with great suspicion because of the numerous one-sided votes critical of
Israel that have been cast in various U.N. fora. As for the Palestinians, they, lacking a state,
have not been admitted to membership in the United Nations and their people and leader
ship have often been treated as pariahs by much of the international community.

May 2003]

More Process than Peace

1681

a pull toward compliance based on a long-run interest in the interna
tional system's success.
Koh identifies "a second explanatory pathway" in modem compli
ance theory as following "a Kantian, liberal vein."98 "The Kantian
thread," says Koh, "divides into two identifiable strands."99 One is
based on Franck's previously discussed "notion of rule-legitimacy, and
another . . . makes more expansive claims for the causal role of
national identity."100 In the second camp, says Koh, are " '[l]iberal
international relations' theorists, such as Andrew Moravcsik and
Anne-Marie Slaughter, [who] have argued that the determinative
factor for whether nations obey can be found, not at a systemic level,
but at the level of domestic structure. "101 Koh explains that:
Under this view, compliance depends significantly on whether or not the
state can be characterized as "liberal" in identity, that is, having a form
of representative government, guarantees of civil and political rights, and
a judicial system dedicated to the rule of law. Flipping the now-familiar
Kantian maxim that "democracies don't fight one another," these theo
rists posit that liberal democracies are more likely to 'do law' with one
another . . . .1 02

As a set of agreements between a relatively liberal democracy and an
authoritarian regime, the Oslo Accords did not benefit from this prin
ciple.
The final strand of contemporary compliance theory which Koh
identifies is "a 'constructivist' strand."103 Koh explains that " [u]nlike
interest theorists, who tend to treat state interests as given, 'construc
tivists' have long argued that states and their interests are socially con
structed by 'commonly held philosophic principles, identities, norms of
behavior, or shared terms of discourse.' "104 Under this view, says Koh,
nations "obey international rules not just because of sophisticated cal
culations about how compliance or noncompliance will affect their in
terests, but because a repeated habit of obedience remakes their inter
ests so that they come to value rule compliance.''105 This type of pull
towards compliance also had relatively little impact on the Oslo proc
ess because 1) the parties, as relative outsiders to the international le
gal community (this was especially true of the Palestinians) had not
developed a habit of obedience to international law, and 2) the gradu98. Koh, supra note 87, at 2633.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101 . Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2634.
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alism of the Oslo process meant that many of its norms were regularly
changing and thus also not subject to the development of habitual
obedience.
Thus we see that the Oslo Accords' perceived legitimacy and pull
towards compliance were weak from the very beginning. The protago
nists' history, nature, and place in the international community had
left the Accords with relatively little compliance-pull potential to draw
from. Mistakes in working with what compliance-pull potential was
left were particularly liable to be fatal.
D. Building Blocks
The next category of contribution which international law can
make to peacemaking is "building blocks." Building blocks are the
"nuts and bolts" out of which peace agreements, as well as interim
processes such as Oslo's, are built. Some of the building blocks which
international law offers to negotiators seeking to craft peace processes
and final agreements are those which Blix and Emerson provide
examples of in their Treaty Maker's Handbook,'06 i.e., the types of
agreements and provisions that international legal practice has devel
oped for recording in a binding, written fashion the various aspects of
a "meeting of the minds" between two contending parties. Types of
agreement include, for example, declarations of principles, implemen
tation memoranda, protocols, and "notes for the record." Types of
provisions include chapeaux, jurisdictional provisions, definitional
provisions, and entry into force provisions. Another type of building
block might be roughly defined as "mechanisms": these include 1 ) the
many different types of practical commitments and processes, set out
in an agreement, that can be used to advance towards the parties'
goals, including elections, transitional periods, anti-incitement provi
sions, redeployments, and delegations of power; and 2) the many dif
ferent types of conceptual tools or methodologies upon which the
parties can rely to reflect in the legal text their level of agreement,
including specificity, ambiguity, paralleled reciprocity, and open
ended gradualistic processes.
As we discussed, many compliance-pull factors are predetermined
by the parties' history, nature, and place in the international commu
nity. The creative use of building blocks, on the other hand, is where a
treaty's negotiators have the opportunity to make the most of the
compliance-pull potential that is left. The building blocks, and espe
cially the mechanisms, are also the key points where the international
legal rubber meets the road. On a day-to-day basis, it is, for example,
the specifics of an agreement's anti-incitement provisions that will

106. THE TREATY MAKER'S HANDBOOK (Hans Blix & Jirina H. Emerson eds., 1973).
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govern one party's television programming and the other side's
response to it. In other words, in the absence of a coercive Israeli
censor sitting in the Palestinian television studio, it is the compliance
pull of the anti-incitement provisions, including their clarity and their
coherence, that will play the key role in determining whether they are
obeyed.
As mentioned above, little scholarly attention has thus far been
paid to how peace process and agreement provisions can be designed
so as to maximize the likelihood that parties will comply with them.
This Part has provided an overview of the legal tools which peace pro
cess framers and agreement drafters can draw upon to maximize the
likelihood of compliance. Parts IV and V of this Review will assess in
more detail the pivotal effect on the parties' compliance of the exten
sive use in the Accords of two key mechanisms - ambiguity and
open-ended gradualism. It is this author's hope that these Parts will
make some small contribution to advancing the study of how peace
process and agreement provisions can be designed so as to maximize
the likelihood that parties will comply with them.
III. THE POSSIBILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF BAD FA ITH
Before addressing in detail pivotal, methodological aspects of the
Oslo Accords, this Review must address the point of view that any
inquiry into Oslo's failure to achieve its declared objective should
begin and end with Yasser Arafat's unwillingness to make peace with
Israel on any terms. At a March 13, 2003, Congressional hearing,
Secretary of State Colin Powell, in discussing the lack of progress
toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement, said that "(t]he princi
pal problem has been the continuing violence and terrorism that has
come from the Palestinian side directed against the State of Israel."1 07
Powell continued, "We had made it clear to the Palestinian side that
they needed to bring up new leadership because the old leadership
was not getting the violence under control and was not coming for
ward with initiatives or ideas that would help us build a dialogue with
Israel." 1 08
Powell was referring, of course, to the June 24, 2002, Rose Garden
speech in which President Bush said that "peace requires a new and
different Palestinian leadership," and called "on the Palestinian
people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror" be-

1 07. Powell Faults Palestinians in Mideast, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 13, 2003, available
at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
108. Id.
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cause " [t]oday, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing,
terrorism. "109
In discussing President Bush's June 24, 2002, speech, National
Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice said that the Palestinian leadership
"has shown no ability or willingness, particularly willingness, to use its
authority to fight terror . . . "1 w "Palestinian leaders," Rice noted,
"rejected a possibility of peace and a state from an Israeli Prime
Minister who was willing to go further than anybody ever thought."1 1 1
"This administration," said Rice, "has tried with the current
Palestinian leadership to make progress, but all that we've gotten in
return is continued activities that support and encourage terror. "112
"How," asked Rice, "can you work with a leadership that on one hand
says it wants the peace process and on the other hand continues to
work with terrorists who are undermining the peace process?"113
Joel Singer, Israel's attorney who joined the process while it was
still in its early stages in Oslo, has stated that "Oslo did not die from a
thousand pinpricks . . . the problem was and is that the Palestinians
don't have a leadership which is capable of making peace with
Israel."1 14 "The only issue," he says, "lies outside the words of the
agreement, and that is that the Palestinians are not ready for peace."115
A thorough analysis of the causes of Oslo's failure needs to take
into account the possibility that a successful deal was impossible
because Yasser Arafat was from the beginning acting in bad faith.116
Not surprisingly, bad-faith negotiation in implementation of an
.

109. Press Release, White House, President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership
(June 24, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
1 10. Insight (CNN International Television Broadcast, July 1, 2002) (transcript available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
111. Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleeza Rice (June 27, 2002)
(transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
112. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, June 30, 2002) (transcript available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library).

113. Kenneth R. Bazinet, U.S.: Arafat in Rearview Mirror, DAI LY NEWS (New York),
July 1, 2002, at 9.
114. Telephone Interview with Joel Singer, Israel's Attorney (Feb. 1 1 , 2003).
1 1 5. Id.
116. See, for example, Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, FOREIGN POL Y, July
1 , 2002, at 18-19 ("ls there any sign that Arafat has changed and is ready to make historic
decisions for peace? I see no indication of it."). See also the noted left-wing Israeli historian
Benny Morris who, in writing that recent "Palestinian behavior" has "provided the unhappy
ground for a serious re-examination of my own political assumptions," posits "the possibility
that Oslo, from Arafat's perspective, may have been a giant act of duplicity." Arafat, notes
Morris, "told a Muslim audience in a Johannesburg mosque in 1994 that he was willing to
play along in order to win concessions but without ever intending to sign a final peace treaty
that recognized Israel's permanent legitimacy and permanent boundaries." Benny Morris,
Bleak Conclusions from the History of a People, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 2003-Apr. 28,
2003, at 31.
'
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agreement to negotiate towards agreement is a violation of customary
international law. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties codifies the requirement, stating that every international
agreement in force "is binding upon the parties to it and must be per
formed by them in good faith."1 17 The Vienna Convention does not it
self contain a definition of either good or bad faith, but Article 2.5 of
the Unidroit Principles contains the following definition of "bad faith"
which seems particularly appropriate for an "agreement to agree" of
the Oslo type: "it is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or
continue negotiations intending not to reach an agreement with the
other party. " 1 1 8
One might note that if Yasser Arafat entered into the Oslo process
in bad faith, it would, notwithstanding Kim Jong 11 and Saddam
Hussein, be a relatively rare phenomenon on the international scene.
According to Richard Bilder, "in almost all cases nations carry out
their agreements in good faith."119 As Bilder puts it, "a fear that
nations enter into international agreements with the idea of cheating
or tricking the other party assumes a Machiavellian rationality and
flexibility of which most governments are not capable in the real
world."120 It is obviously hard to imagine a democracy, with its checks
and balances and relatively open decisionmaking, entering into an
agreement in bad faith. It is less difficult to imagine a dictatorship,
where all decisionmaking is ultimately in the head of one man, so
doing.
It may ultimately be impossible to know whether or not Yasser
Arafat intended to keep his word when he wrote to Yitzhak Rabin on
September 9, 1993, that " [t]he PLO commits itself . . . to a peaceful
resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all
outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved
through negotiations" and that "the PLO renounces the use of terror
ism and other acts of violence. "121 As Dennis Ross - the lead U.S. ne
gotiator for most of the Oslo process, including Camp David - put it:
1 17. See WATSON, supra note 8, at 124.
118. Quoted in Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and
Precontractual Liability, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 97, 152 (1997).
119. RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 8
(1981). Or as Louis Henkin asserted in How Nations Behave in 1968, "It is probably the case
that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of
their obligations almost all of the time." HENKIN, supra note 76, at 42. Writing some thirty
years later, Harold Koh opined of Henkin's assertion that "empirical work since then seems
largely to have confirmed this hedged but optimistic description." Koh, supra note 87, at
2599. But see Haas, Choosing to Comply, supra note 86, at 44, who says that "[t]he lawyers'
dictum that 'most treaties are complied with most of the time' is surely premature, and
probably exaggerated."
120. BILDER, supra note 1 1 9, at 9-10.
121. Letter from Arafat to Rabin (Sept. 9, 1993), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at
315.
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You couldn't conclude [the conflict], as it turned out, because you had
someone like Yasser Arafat, for whom ending the conflict in many ways
required ending himself. He was defined by conflict. He was defined by
struggle. He was defined by the cause. To end it was something that was
more than he could do, because it meant giving up his mythologies . . .
Yasser Arafat . . . simply was not up to the task. 122

But the possibility of such bad faith, whenever it may have entered
into play, does not mean that the only lesson to be learned from Oslo's
failure is the danger of signing agreements with the likes of Yasser
Arafat. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are going to go away,
and Yasser Arafat is certainly not going to be around forever. Indeed,
if the vast majority of the commentators, from across the spectrum, in
Lessons of Failure are right, analysis of the flaws of the Oslo process is
essential for at least two reasons. First, the open-ended gradualism
and ambiguity of the Oslo Accords dearly had a corrosive effect in
and of themselves, as this Review will discuss. There are lessons to be
learned from this that are generally applicable to designing peace ne
gotiations and peace agreement texts to maximize compliance with
their terms. Second, any peace deal the Israelis and Palestinians ulti
mately reach will likely use the Oslo Accords as a point of departure.
This will be in keeping with the past history of Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations, over the course of which, as Stein and Lewis report:
"Yesterday's rejected or ignored proposal, document, or procedure
may become tomorrow's accepted agreement, newly adopted position,
or process. " 123 If this is the case, it is critical to understand which
aspects of the Oslo Accords should, on the basis of experience thus
far, be disqualified from reappearing irrespective of the leader on the
Palestinian side of the deal.
IV.

OPEN-ENDED GRADUALISM

The first problematic methodology on which the Oslo Accords
heavily relied was open-ended gradualism. "Open-endedness" is this
Reviewer's term for the Oslo Accords having left virtually completely
"open for a later agreement"124 the fundamental question of what a
permanent-status agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians
would look like. Terje Roed-Larsen defined the separate but related
concept of "gradualism" as "moving gradually forward and building
trust along the way."125 This Part focuses first on open-endedness and
then on gradualism.
1 22. Q & A with Jim Clancy (CNN International television broadcast, Dec. 26, 2002)
(transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
123. STEIN & LEWIS, supra note 10, at 25-26.
124. Singer, supra note 26.
125. Roed-Larsen, supra note 32, at 6.
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In the opening essay to Lessons of Failure, Robert Rothstein
starkly notes of the Oslo Accords that "much was left unresolved by
Oslo - nearly everything of substance. "126 Indeed - and this cannot
be emphasized enough - almost none of the over one thousand pages
of agreements, annexes, maps, and other documentation127 that consti
tute the Oslo Accords say anything at all about the terms of a final
agreement.
The full name of the DOP is the "Declaration of Principles on
Interim Self-Government Arrangements." Although the full title is
rarely used, it is entirely appropriate to the Declaration, the provisions
of which relate almost entirely to interim-status issues. Indeed, of the
seventeen articles in the Declaration of Principles, only the Preamble,
Article I (titled "Aim of the Negotiations"), and Article V (titled
"Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations") provide
any clues about the permanent-status negotiations, let alone the terms
of a final settlement.
The preamble states in relevant part:
The [parties] agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confronta
tion and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights,
and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security
· and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and
historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. 128

Article I states:
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle
East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority . . . for a transitional period not
exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the
whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status
will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and

338.129
Article V states in relevant part:

Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but
not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period,
between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people represen
tatives.
2.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues,
including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, bor126. Robert L. Rothstein, A Fragile Peace: Could a "Race to the Bottom" Have Been
A voided?, in LESSONS OF FAILURE, pp. 1, 4 [hereinafter'Rothstein, "Race to the Bottom "].
127. See KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 57.
128. DOP Preamble, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 317.
129. DOP Article I, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 317.

1688

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1661

ders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of
common interest.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status nego

tiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached
for the interim period. 1 30

That is it. The DOP contains no further guidance on final-status
issues. As Joel Singer, the lawyer on the Israeli government team
which negotiated the DOP, has put it, the DOP is "conspicuously
silent about the form the permanent status arrangements will take,"
and "the principle that all options should be left open is explicitly
stated in Article V(4)." 131
The other Oslo Accords add virtually nothing to this extreme
vagueness about permanent status. Nowhere do any of the Oslo
Accords mention the possibility of Palestinian statehood. Thus, with
respect to permanent status, the Oslo Accords could be characterized
as an agreement to agree with all options (except a resort to violence)
left open. 1 32
International agreements, including international peace agree
ments, are of course basically a form of contract. Because legal sys
tems have much more experience with commercial contracts than with
peace contracts, it is worth taking a moment to examine what contract
law has to say about the sort of open-endedness at the heart of the
Oslo Accords.
An 1857 quote from a member of the House of Lords, reported by
Farnsworth, pithily summarized the attitude of traditional contract
theory towards open-ended agreements: "An agreement to enter into
an agreement upon terms to be afterwards settled by the parties is a
contradiction in terms. It is absurd . . . . "133 The traditional view is that
"no contract can be formed until clear and complete agreement is
reached on material terms." 1 34 In straying from that principle, the
DOP is consistent with a recent trend in commercial contract law
towards believing that "preliminary agreements serve a valuable func
tion in the marketplace. " 1 35 As Farnsworth recognizes, the concept of
an agreement "that is made during negotiations in anticipation of
some later agreement that will be the culmination of negotiations" is
130. DOP Article V, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 318.
131. Joel Singer, The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements: Some Legal Aspects, JUST., Winter 1994, at 4, 13.
132. Id. at 5.
133. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 2 1 7, 264 (1 987).
134. Kostritsky, supra note 29, at 623 n.2. (quoting EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E.
SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 41 1-12 (4th ed. 1 991)).
135. Id. at 5.
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now reflected in a number of commercial legal tools, including letters
of intent, commitment letters, binders, agreements in principle, and
memoranda of understandings.136
One pair of commentators has written:
Recent changes in modern international transactions have led to an
increased reliance on precontractual instruments. Commercial transac
tions are increasingly consummated between parties of diverse cultural
and legal traditions. Parties are often unfamiliar with the ethical rules
and legal ramifications of the negotiating process in other countries,
which may lead the parties to write out their goals at a relatively early
stage of the negotiation. 1 37

Because cultural and legal differences increase the risk of misun
derstanding and "impede[) the development of personal trust," these
differences "increas[e] the perceived need fo r written protection" at a
relatively early stage of the process.138 The use of agreements to agree
seems to be particularly common in international joint-venture nego
tiations. In such negotiations - as with Oslo - there is "a meeting,
and sometimes, a clash, of two cultures," and the process of negotiat
ing the interim and final agreements is an "integral" part of the
bridge-building.139
But a critical factor distinguishes the Oslo Accords from the pre
liminary agreements with open terms in the commercial world. Courts
are available to resolve commercial disputes or, in certain circum
stances, even to impose reasonable contract terms. For example, as the
Uniform Commercial Code notes, courts can determine and supply
the price term - "a reasonable price at the time for delivery" should negotiations on price fail with respect to a binding agreement
for the sale of goods that leaves the price open for later determination
by the parties.140 And international joint-venture attorneys know that
" [a )!though parties to joint venture negotiations are not eager to
confront the possibility of deadlock, it is always a good idea to include
provisions governing what happens when the parties cannot agree. "141
Because commercial assets are relatively easy to value and there is
136. Farnsworth, supra note 133, at 249-50.
137. John Klein & Carla Bachechi, Precontracttta/ Liability and the Ditty of Good Faith
Negotiation in International Transactions, 17 Haus. J. INT'L L. 1 , 8 (1994).
138. Id.
139. Michael E. Hooton, Structuring and Negotiating International Joint Ventures, 27
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1994). Hooton notes that one example of the challenges of
negotiating international joint ventures is "the highly publicized McDonald's joint venture
[in Russia which] took over twelve years to negotiate." Id. at n.6. Compared to this example,
five years may not have been a long time to develop a permanent peace settlement between
the Israelis and Palestinians.
140. Farnsworth, supra note 133, at 253 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1 978)); see also id. at
286.
141. Hooton, supra note 139, at 1028.
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considerable precedent for courts supplying terms or arbitrators allo
cating the assets of a failed joint venture, commercial parties enter
into preliminary agreements with a good sense of what the other party
might reasonably have in mind and considerable certainty as to the
bounds of what might happen if the parties reach deadlock.
The Oslo Accords present a sharp contrast. They constitute an
agreement to agree with all options (except violence) left open, and no
clear sense of what each others' bottom lines might be - in fact
the parties avoided discussing their bottom lines at Oslo. Yet, the
agreements provided no strong mechanism to govern what would
happen if the parties turned out to be unable to reach an agreement. If
the majority of contributors to Lessons of Failure agree on any one
thing, it is that the gradual, open-ended aspects of the Oslo process, so
carefully designed to foster trust, in fact did the opposite - they
corrosively eroded trust. As Rob Malley, a member of the Clinton
Administration negotiating team for the Oslo Accords, and Hussein
Agha of Oxford University have written, " [t]he incrementalism of the
previous decade . . . did not fail as a result of the parties' ill will or a
lack of faithful implementation; rather, it was the approach that con
tributed to both. " 1 42
There are several reasons why the open-endedness of the Oslo
process may have done more to foster ill will and discourage imple
mentation than to create trust, encourage compliance, and promote
forward movement towards peace:
• Other Side's Motives Left Unclear: Because neither party made a
commitment regarding final status, each party continued to doubt
the other's good faith. The Accords' failure to delineate the
conflict-ending concessions that each party would make meant
that, at any given stage, one side could suspect that the other
side's
shift toward peace is merely tactical, a platform to raise new de
mands or to achieve ancient goals by slower and at least momentar
ily less violent means. The fear of being duped is especially
strong . . . because . . . the consequences of being wrong about the
intentions of the other could be catastrophic for both leaders and
followers. 143

Many Israelis, for example, feared that the PLO was simply im
plementing its infamous "doctrine of stages," by which the PLO
would establish itself on whatever piece of Palestine it could get,
with the intention of using that as a staging ground "to achieve . . .
the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory,"
142. Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, The Last Negotiation: How to End the Middle East
Peace Process, in THE MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS 61 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 2002).
143. Rothstein, "Race to the Bottom, " supra note 126, at 7 .
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including all of Israel.144 Many Israelis feared that for the
Palestinians - and particularly for Yasser Arafat - the interim
period was a cynical "peace" of the kind that Ambrose Bierce
defined as "a period of cheating between two periods of fight
ing."145 Meanwhile, as historian Rashid Khalidi has put it, many
Palestinians feared that
Oslo gave [the Israelis] the luxury of another decade, during
which . . . the people who were paving the West Bank and turning it
into an extension of Israel have gotten another 100,000 Israelis set
tled there, have paved hundreds of miles of roads, and are even less
likely to give up these territories than they might have been a dec
ade or more ago.146

•

•

Thus many Palestinians feared that the implementing agreement
would "de facto [come to represent] the permanent status agree
ment."141
Each Side's Gains Continued to Be Small Enough to Risk Losing:
The Accords' failure to specify, let alone immediately provide,
the major, conflict-ending gains that each party was to eventually
receive meant that neither side had a stake in the agreements'
success that was so large that they were unwilling to risk losing
it.148 Thus, as Palestinian professor Khalil Shikaki stated: "Oslo's
open-endedness . . . meant that neither side would make a full
commitment to the peace process."149 Neither side had rnade, or
clearly stood to make, a gain suffieiently large as to induce such a
commitment.
It's Harder to Aspire to a Hazy Final Status: Because the Accords
specified so little about the ultimate arrangements, leaders on
both sides had no vision to sell to their people. Breakthrough
notes that "developing an attractive vision of a desirable future"
can pull people "forward toward agreement" (p. xx). John Paul
Lederach points out that, in intrastate conflicts, "the futures of

144. Yossi Ben-Aharon, Foundering ll111Sions: The Demise of the Oslo Process, in
LESSONS OF FAILURE, pp. 59-60.
145. Justus R. Weiner, Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace?, 24
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 62 (2000) (quoting AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S .
DICTIONARY (T.Y. Cromwell 1979) (1911)).
146. Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 8, 2002) (transcript
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
147. Justus R. Weiner, An Analysis of the Oslo II Agreement in Light ofthe Expectations
of Shimon Peres and Mahmoud A bbas, 17 MICH J. INT'L L. 667, 699 (1996) (reviewing
SHIMON PERES, BATTLING FOR PEACE: A MEMOIR (1995) and MAHMOUD ABBAS,
THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS (1995)).
.

148. Rothstein, "Race to the Bottom, " supra note 126, at 5.
149. Khalil Shikaki, Ending the Conflict: Can the Parties Afford It?, in LESSONS OF
FAILURE, pp. 37, 40.
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those who are fighting are ultimately and intimately linked and
interdependent." Accordingly, it is particularly important that the
"[o]pportunity . . . be given for people to look forward and envi
sion their shared future."150 Yet, because it was so open-ended,
Oslo gave leaders on both sides very little material they could use
to sketch a promising future to which their peoples could aspire.
Rothstein notes that "it is hard to build a constituency for peace
when the shape of the peace remains unclear and unsettled. "151
As Manuel Hassassian, the Executive Vice President of
Bethlehem University, put it, Oslo's open-endedness put on
people "pressure to give up long-held values while not knowing
what they will get in return."152
Progress Left Hostage to Extremists: The Oslo process began
with unofficial contacts which, when they proved promising, were
turned into official negotiations. Ron Pundak was one of the two
Israeli academics who started the unofficial process. Pundak
eventually concluded of the Accords that " [o]utstanding issues . . .
leave the agreement hostage to extremists on both sides, who . . .
continue to fight in order to thwart the possibility of concluding
these issues in future negotiations, and thereby leave the process
of peace and reconciliation at their mercy." 153 The mounting
damage caused by these extremists, and particularly the Palestin
ian terrorists, was one key factor that gradually sapped the
Accords' legitimacy.
Both Sides Continually Seek to Improve Their Positions for Final
Negotiations: As Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki observed,
"since 'real' negotiations have not even started, both sides sought
to improve their negotiating positions. "154 Rob Malley and
Hussein Agha agree, saying "both sides treated the interim
period . . . as a mere warm-up to the final negotiations; not as a
chance to build trust, but as an opportunity to maximize their
bargaining positions. "155 In a similar vein, Joel Singer noted that

150. LEDERACH, supra note 2, at 27.
1 5 1 . Rothstein, Are There Only Lessons, supra note 30, at 163.
152. Manuel Hassassian, Why Did Oslo Fail? Lessons for the Future, in LESSONS OF
FAILURE, pp. 1 1 4, 1 16.
153. Ron Pundak, From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?, in LESSONS OF FAILURE, pp.
88, 105. Israeli journalist Ze'ev Schiff has written of this phenomenon as follows: " Both
sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians equally and in fact also the American mediators, did
not understand that prolonged procrastination in the implementation of sensitive agree
ments opens the door to actions by extremists on both sides, the aim of which is to torpedo
any compromise." Ze'ev Schiff, The lies after Oslo, HAARETZ, May 30, 2002, available at
http://www.haaretzdaily.com.
154. Shikaki, supra note 149, at 40.
155. Agha & Malley, supra note 1 42, at S L
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the interim period established by Oslo in some ways resembled a
cease-fire: "If you know a cease-fire is being negotiated and you
have two more days to do whatever you can do before it is im
posed . . . you use those last two days to improve your position. In
this case, instead of two days we have five years." 1 56
Each party may have emphasized position improvement even
more once relations between the parties started to plunge. For
example, when Arafat threatened to resume the intifada against
Israel, then Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon "reacted by telling
Jewish 'settlers to run and capture as many hills as possible . . . .
Everything we don't take will eventually get into the hands of the
Palestinians.' "157 One scholar has written that open-ended proc
esses like Oslo are liable to be treated not as a "framework for in
cubating trust and reconciliation, but as an array of legalistic and
definitive limits for the opposing side versus an array of loopholes
and opportunities for the aggressive, adversarial exploitation of
opportunities for one's own side."158 Rothstein concludes that
"the result was a peace process that became the continuation of
conflict by other means. " 1 59 This was another dynamic that gradu
ally sapped the Accords of their legitimacy. The more steps a
party took that maximized its bargaining position for the end
game, but violated the Accords, the less the other party felt in
clined to comply with the Accords.
Open-endedness Enables Leaders to Feed Dangerous Expecta
tions: The open-endedness of the Oslo texts "allowed each side to
make contrary claims at home," writes David Makovsky. "Israeli
leaders," explains Makovsky, "were able to continually promise
their constituents what they wanted - including a united Jerusa
lem under Israeli sovereignty - while Arafat could promise his
people what they wanted - including the right of return for all
Palestinians to long-abandoned homes inside Israel." Arafat, he
says,
sold Oslo to his public by telling them it guaranteed a return to the
1 967 lines and entailed no compromises. He led his people to be
lieve that they would get 100 percent of the land they wanted. This
unsurprisingly led to unrealistic expectations and the explosion of

15 6. Joel Singer, A Very Bad Agreement, but the Only Agreement Possible, MIDDLE
EAST FORUM, Mar. 19, 1997, at http://www.meforum.org/article/322.
157. Weiner, supra note 145, at 33 (quoting Danna Harman et al., Arafat Warns: Our
Rifles Are Ready, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 17, 1998, at 1) (ellipsis and internal quotation
marks in Weiner)).
158. Ian S. Lustick, The Oslo Agreement as an Obstacle to Peace, 2 7 J. PALESTINE STUD.
61, 62 (1997).
159. Rothstein, Are There Only Lessons, supra note 30, at 18.
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frustration (egged on by the PA) that followed the failure of Camp
David. 1 60

Oslo's framers hoped that during the interim period the gradually
increasing cooperation betwe�n the, two sides, and the concessions of
each side to the other, would build trust that would outweigh the dan
gers of leaving the process open-ended. But, instead, open-endedness
only increased the distrust. Ultimately, distrust infected the process
and prevented the slowly increasing cooperation and gradual conces
sions that were supposed to ,overcome it. Because the two sides were
unclear as to the goals they were trying to achieve by making conces
sions, they had difficulty selling the concessions to their people.
Concessionary "[s]teps that might have been easy to win support for
domestically if packaged as part of a final agreement were condemned
as unwarranted concessions when carried out in isolation."161
The open-ended gradualism of the Accords engendered several
problems in addition to those caused by the open-endedness of the
gradual process's destination. Gradualism turned out to be a severe
detriment in and of itself. For example, the almost continual negotia
tions and renegotiations which were required by Oslo's gradual
approach meant that the Accords were unable to benefit from the
transaction cost savings, which Chayes and Chayes identify as a key
factor encouraging compliance with treaty rules.162 Chayes and Chayes
point out that "[g]overnmental resources for policy analysis and deci
sionmaking are costly and in short supply" and governments "seek to
conserve these resources for the most pressing and urgent matters."163
Since "continuous recalculation" of treaty provision costs and benefits
expends such resources, Chayes and Chayes conclude that rote com
pliance with established treaty provisions "saves transaction costs." 1 64
Since the gradualistic approach of the Oslo Accords meant that many
of the treaty provisions governing Israeli-Palestinian relations were
regularly being reconsidered and/or changing, the Oslo Accords were
rarely able to benefit from the compliance-promoting efficiencies of
routinization. Instead, governmental resources for policy analysis and
decisionmaking on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides were
regularly being expended to calculate the costs and benefits of incre
mental changes. This may have resulted in too few resources being left
available for addressing the most urgent and pressing permanent
status issues.
160. David Makovsky, Middle East Peace Through Partition, in THE MIDDLE EAST IN
CRISIS, supra note 142, at 10.
161. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at 51.
162. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 80, at 4.
1 63. Id.
164. Id.
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The frequent and unpredictable changes to roads, borders and
border procedures, tax collection procedures, and other economic
practicalities that were occasioned by Oslo's gradualistic evolution
also made it hard for business, which hungers for stability and predict
ability, to develop a vested, material interest in the Accords. At the
same time, the scale of the many individual agreements was too small
to engender encouragement by outsiders of the sort that might have
helped positively influence implementation by the parties. As Malley
puts it, "the succession of piecemeal, incremental agreements made it
more difficult to mobilize the support of other countries."165
Manuel Hassassian, the Executive Vice President of Bethlehem
University, contends that the succession of minor, interim �greements
also caused the two publics to become increasingly skeptical as to the
value of agreements between the two sides: "What made the situa
tion . . incomprehensible to the public on both sides is that
agreements were signed one after the other, yet on the ground things
were not improving."166 Hassassiari notes:
.

·

After agreements were signed, and the handshakes and the hugs, the
next day was business as usual in terms of the actual conflict on the
ground. An agreement was followed with an implementation protocol,
then another protocol for the implementation of the implementation
protocol. The process was simply no longer credible . . . . 167

Rob Malley and Hussein Agha contend that gradualism also
increased friction between the two leaderships, noting that "[b]y mul
tiplying the number of obligations each side agreed to, the successive
interim accords increased the potential for missteps and missed
deadlines."168 "Each interim commitment," says Malley, "became the
focal point for the next dispute and a microcosm for the overall con
flict, leading to endless renegotiations and diminished respect for the
text of the signed agreements themselves."169 Thus, the open-ended
gradualism of the Oslo Accords not only failed to build trust and
confidence, it created a dynamic that in many ways over time actually
eroded the Accords' legitimacy.
The detriments of Oslo's open-ended, gradual approach have led
virtually every one of the Lessons of Failure · commentators who
believe peace is possible to the conclusion that the Oslo process would
have been better off with much greater clarity as to final status from
the very beginning. Irrespective of whether such was possible in 1993,
·

165. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at 51.
166. Hassassian, supra note 152, at 1 19.
167. Id.
1 68. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at 51.
169. Id.
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they each believe that getting the parties to agree to at least a broad
outline of the final settlement is imperative now.
Ron Pundak suggests that "while its implementation could be and perhaps should be - gradual," the outlines of a permanent-status
agreement must be made clear to both sides.110 Hassassian agrees,
saying that "there should have been general agreement from the be
ginning on the key issues. It is the details that can be worked out step
by step, but not the guiding principles. In fact, the problem with the
guiding principles adopted in Oslo is that they were too vague."171
Israeli professor Moshe Ma'oz believes that:
an Israeli vague commitment regarding the creation of a Palestinian state
in the West Bank and Gaza say, within five years, with a certain status in
East Jerusalem to be negotiated could have served as a strong incentive
to the PLO to fully and credibly implement its commitments to Israel,
particularly in the arena of security.172

"In return," says Ma'oz, "the PLO could have allayed Israeli concerns
had it committed itself at Oslo to implement the Palestinian refugees'
'right of return' in the future Palestinian state, not in the state of Israel
proper." 173
The failed "Road Map" set forth by the Bush Administration in
the winter and spring of 2003 was in one respect much clearer than the
Oslo Accords had been as to the ultimate goal of the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Road Map included an explicit
commitment to the goal of creating a Palestinian state, an historic con
cession from the Israeli perspective.174
But the Road Map left further details regarding the Palestinian
state, including its borders and other potential attributes (e.g., demili
tarized status), unspecified. As Max Abrahms writes in a Los Angeles
Times op-ed, "The road map takes off where Oslo failed. It again
postpones the difficult final-status issues."175 Khalil Shikaki says the
Road Map "didn 't give the Palestinians enough incentive to move
forward" because it left too open "what they would be getting in
the end" with respect to borders, settlement removal, and degree of
limitations on sovereignty.176 The Road Map also left too much open
170. Pundak, supra note 1 53, at 106.
171. Hassassian, supra note 152, at 127.
172. Moshe Ma'oz, The Oslo Peace Process: From Breakthrough to Breakdown, in
LESSONS OF FAILURE, pp. 133, 135.
173. Id.
1 74. See Press Statement, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, A Performance
Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Apr.
30, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062pf.htm.
175. Max Abrahms, Editorial, Road Map Torn by Ambiguity, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2003,
at 813.
1 76. Charles A. Radin, Some See End of Road for Abbas, Peace Plan, BOSTON GLOBE,
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from an Israeli perspective. For example, on the Palestinian "right of
return," which the Palestinians must concede if the Israelis are to
agree to a permanent agreement, the "Road Map" contained no
significant concessions. Thus both Israelis and Palestinians were left to
feel that the Road Map was still too open-ended.
In addition, the Road Map's complex list of phases and steps
suffered from the same gradualism problems as did the Oslo Accords.
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley describe the Road Map's problems
as follows:
The Bush administration's road map . . . is faltering - because of its own
deficiencies, not merely those of the negotiating parties. Like past peace
plans, it is based on the idea that incremental stages will bring Israelis
and Palestinians to the point where they can negotiate the issues that
separate them. 1 77

"Because the ultimate solution remains up for grabs," contend
Agha and Malley, the Road Map "protagonists pursue policies
designed to shape its contours rather than to promote a common
enterprise. The vagueness of the goal and an excess of suspicion mean
that neither side has an incentive to live up to its obligations in a
wholehearted way."178 Agha and Malley add that " [e]ach incremental
gesture becomes the focal point of the next crisis" and " [e]very addi
tional step creates one more opportunity for a misstep or deliberate
sabotage."179
Because the Road Map required that so many incremental steps be
accomplished in such impossibly short time frames, it practically guar
anteed that many steps would not be accomplished, thereby further
undermining the credibility of the peace process and adding yet more
to both sides' lists of unkept commitments.180 At the same time, the
Road Map offered "no view as to what constitutes compliance (i.e.,
100 percent effort, 100 percent results, or 'reasonable effort producing
passable results'?), nor does it prioritize which requirements are
deal-breakers. " 1 8 1 "In substance," concludes Robert Satloff, "the
roadmap fails to live up to claims to reflect lessons learned from the

Aug. 27, 2003, at Al.
177. Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, Ditch the Road Map. Just Get There Already,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2003, at B2.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Robert Satloff, Mideast Roadmap leads to a dead end, BALT. SUN, Apr. 27,
2003, at SC [hereinafter Satloff, Mideast Roadmap].
181. Robert Satloff, The Road Not to Be Taken: Assessing the Quartet Roadmap for Is
raeli-Palestinian Peacemaking, Peacewatch (Wash. Inst. for Near East Policy, Washington,
D.C.), Oct. 23, 2002, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/
peacewatch2002/402.htm.
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1993 Oslo peace accords."182
Some commentators in Lessons of Failure and elsewhere have
come to the conclusion that the next step in the Oslo process should
be imposition of a final agreement. One of the most prominent recent
exponents of such an approach is T�rje Roed-Larsen, who was one of
the key, if not the key, initiators of the open-ended gradualism ap
proach.183 Another recent proponent of an imposed agreement is the
Agha/Malley team, which argues that "the parties must be presented
with a full-fledged, non-negotiable final agreement."184 But Agha and
Malley disagree that "a. permanent solution must await the building of
trust between the two sides."185 They contend that " [m]istrust, enmity,
and suspicion are the consequences of the conflict, not its cause."186 "A
deal," they say, "should not be made dependent on preexisting mutual
trust; the deal itself will create it." 187 But Agha and Malley fail to make
a convincing argument for why the "full-fledged, non-negotiable
agreement" they propose would lead to a better result than the "full
fledged, non-negotiable agreement" offered up by President Clinton
or the Road Map which was "presented to Israel and the Palestinians
as a fait accompli," giving it "the dubious distinction of being the first
u.s.-endorsed peace plan in decades that the local parties did not
themselves negotiate."188 As National Security Adviser Rice has
stated, the Palestinian leadership:
rejected a possibility of peace and a state from an Israeli Prime Minister
who was willing to go further than anybody ever thought. Very
strenuous efforts on the part of the United St11tes under the Clinton
Administration, and the current Palestinian leadership couldn't find its
way to accept that. And so opportunity after opportunity after opportu
nity has been missed by this Palestinian leadership . . . . 1 89

If the Palestinian leadership, and especially Yasser Arafat, is funda
mentally unwilling to end the conflict with Israel, no imposed solution
will be able to make that leadership take the volitional steps of per
manently calling off and disarming the terrorists and beginning a
genuine and irreversible process of historic reconciliation.
Negotiations theorists tend to be skeptical of imposed solutions.
Breakthrough warns that "a settlement that is imposed on the dispu1 82. Satloff, Mideast Roadmap, supra note 180.
1 83. See Roed-Larsen, supra note 32.
1 84. Agha & Malley, supra note 142, at 53.
1 85. Id.
1 86. Id.
1 87. Id.
1 88. Robert Satloff, Don 't treat the "road map " as gospel, and tread cautiously, L.A.
TIMES, May 18, 2003, at Ml.
1 89. Press Briefing·by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleeza Rice, supra note 111.
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tants is inherently unstable" because " [o]ne or more of the contending
parties will view the settlement as illegitimate and feel free to violate
its terms" once they get the opportunity (p. 93) .
The lead American negotiator, ' Denhis Ross; believes for similar
reasons that imposing a peace deal oh the Israelis and Palestinians is
"absolutely not" the right thing to do. 1 90 "If an imposed solution were
possible and would hold," says Ross, "I would be prepared to support
it. But an imposed solution is an illusion."191 Arafat, says Ross, "would
certainly go along with an imposed outcome. He has always preferred
such an option. It would relieve him of the' responsibility to make a
decision. "192 With an imposed agreement, says Ross, Araf�t "can
outwardly acquiesce, saying he has no choice. But inevitably, Pales
tinians will oppose at least part of an imposed outcome," and may
even create "newly discovered grievances" such as those that Hizbul
lah has fabricated to create excuses to attack Israel even after Israel's
full withdrawal from Lebanon. 193
"If one overriding lesson from the past persists," says Ross, "it is
that the Palestinians must make decisions and bea� the responsibility
of those decisions. " 194 "No enduring peace can be reached," says Ross,
"until the Palestinian leadership levels with its public, resists the temp
tation to blame every ill on the Israelis or the outside world, assumes
responsibility for controversial decisions, and stands by its decision in
the face of opposition."195 In fact, says Ross, "[a]n imposed solution
will only delay the day when all sides, but especially the Palestinians,
have to assume real responsibilities. Consequently, an imposed solu
tion would be no solution at all."196
Irrespective of what the best way forward might be, it is clear that
open-ended gradualism did not work. Indeed, it seems to have oper
ated to frustrate the confidence and trust it was supposed to promote.
It is obviously impossible to say whether an Oslo process devised to
include fewer interim steps and a greater clarity as to final status
in
other words, with less reliance on open-ended gradualism - would
have brought peace by now. But future peace negotiators, whether in
this or other conflicts, should be very hesitant to repeat Oslo's
"uniquely structured" methodological approach to peacemaking. The
experiment failed.
.

·

-

190. Ross, supra note 1 16, at 24.
1 91. Id.
1 92. Id.
193. Id.
1 94. Id. at 26.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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CONSTRUCTIVE AM BIGUITY

A second key methodological aspect of the Oslo Accords that was
meant to facilitate reconciliation but that . seems instead to have had,
overall, the opposite effect is the Accords' extensive use of "construc
tive ambiguity. " For the purposes of this Review, the use of "construc
tive ambiguity" in an agreement text means the deliberate use of
vague, equivocal, or ambiguous language which, as discussed earlier, is
capable of being interpreted by each of the parties as protecting their
own interests and positions.197
A variety of commentators have complained about the extent to
which "constructive ambiguity" was used in the Oslo Accords. Watson
speaks of "the constructive ambiguity that plagues all of the
Accords." 198 Manuel Hassassian complains that the Oslo "implementa
tion mechanisms were too ambiguous and the agreement meant dif
ferent things to each side."199 Edward Said has described the Oslo
Accords as "an interpreter's nightmare, a patchwork of . . . deliberate
ambiguities and obfuscations."200 Hanan Ashrawi has expressed her
concern at "the gaps, ambiguities, lack of detail and absence of im
plementation mechanisms" in the DOP.201 Ashrawi contended that the
DOP contained so many "areas of ambiguity and friction, the agree
ment could backfire or implode at any time."202 Israeli professor
Aharon Kleiman, in his book, Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East
Peace-Making ("Constructive Ambiguity"), dedicates several chapters
to the ambiguities of the various Oslo Accords. The bottom line of his
analysis is "the post-Oslo deadlock's total predictability because of its
inordinately strong component of 'constructive ambiguity.' "203
Kleiman helpfully outlines the history of reliance on constructive
ambiguity in the Middle East conflict, " [s]tretching from the Balfour
Declaration to the 1998 Wye River Memorandum" and beyond.204 He
notes that a "growing penchant for papering over differences . . . rep
resents one major point of continuity in the long . . . struggle for mas
tery over Palestine. "205
Kleiman contends that the practice of constructive ambiguity may
have first gained wide currency during Henry Kissinger's tenure as
1 97. See, e.g. , BILDER, supra note 1 19, at 37-38; KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 13.
198. WATSON, supra note 8, at 72.
199. Hassassian, supra note 152, at 1 19.
200. KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 69.
20 L Id. at 70.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1 1 .
204. Id. a t 35.
205. Id.
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National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.206 Kissinger's mem
oirs, notes Kleiman, "provide the most spirited, unabashed defense
available anywhere of constructive ambiguity."207 Kleiman contrasts
the Kissinger statement that "[s]ometimes the art of diplomacy is to
keep the obvious obscured," with Kissinger's "derision for the efforts
of his predecessor in crafting the 1969 Roger Plan of 1969 for an Arab
Israeli settlement: 'straightforward and unambiguous, it did not get
far.' "208
In Kissinger: A Biography, Walter Isaacson provides the following
compelling description of Henry Kissinger's use of ambiguity in
peacemaking:
Where Kissinger's genius came into play, for better or worse, was in dis
guising some of the concessions, fudging controversial issues, and
wrapping it all in creative ambiguity. Some might see the purpose of a
peace accord as being to set forth in clear terms precisely what both sides
have accepted. Kissinger approached it from a different perspective: on
some fundamental disputes, he purposely devised language that could
mean one thing to one side and something else to the other.209

A.

The Benefits ofAmbiguity

Notwithstanding Kissinger's genius for it, the use of ambiguity in
peacemaking is a double-edged sword. The following are among the
goals (some of them overlapping at the margins) that it can help
achieve:
• Completely Defer the Issue to Another Day: Watson argues that
the use of "deliberate ambiguity" in the Oslo Accords "allowed
the parties to focus on those matters on which they could readily
agree and to defer on those which they could not. . . . [T]he Oslo
Accords demonstrate that it can be a useful tool for isolating and
defusing deal-breakers."210 Bilder emphasizes that "equivocal or
ambiguous language can be particularly useful in helping the par
ties to bridge disagreements as to minor or more peripheral pro
visions of a proposed arrangement. "21 1 He notes that "nations
often use equivocal language to bypass such peripheral issues,
leaving them to later negotiation should they arise and their solu
tion prove necessary."212 Entirely bypassing an issue is a job for
206. Id. at 29.
207. Id. at 30.
208. Id. at 32.
209. WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY 481-82 (1992).
210. WATSON, supra note 8, at 309.
2 1 1 . B I LDER, supra note 1 19, at 40.
212. Id.
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exceptionally ambiguous language, and/or studied silence re
garding the contentious issue. The question of Palestinian state
hood, which was far from a minor or peripheral issue, was han
dled more or less this way in the Oslo Accords. Only a few vague
references, such as those to "mutual legitimate and political
rights,'' even hinted at the existence of the question of whether
the Oslo process would result in Palestinian statehood.
Establish Basis for Continued Negotiation of the Issue: On occa
sion, negotiators do not wish to completely ignore an issue or
wholly defer it to an unspecified future date. Instead, the negotia
tors wish to reference the issue in the agreement pending before
them while keeping the issue from preventing closure on that
agreement. They can achieve this with a provision specifically
committing the parties to negotiate the issue within a different
framework or at some future time. Richard Bilder notes that even
where the parties cannot reach any common understanding as to
an issue, ambiguous language "permits them at least to commit
themselves to cooperative approaches to the problem."213 Simply
including an issue i.n a written agreement, says Bilder, can help
establish a basis for further negotiation, including perhaps "an
institutional framework and negotiating parameters in which a
more genuine agreement can, over time, be more easily
achieved."214 This is more or less what the Oslo framers did in
agreeing to eventually engage in permanent-status negotiations to
"cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settle
ments, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation
with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest."2 1 5
While a procedural framework was established for negotiating
the specified "remaining issues,'' its substantive result was kept
almost entirely open-ended.
Enable a Provision to Be Flexible: "Flexible" provisions are able
to bend in meaning to match changed needs and circumstances.
Negotiators wishing to create flexible provisions will turn to
ambiguous language because "excessive specificity in an agree
ment may lead to undesirable rigidity in application of the
agreement and an inability of the parties to adjust their arrange
ment readily to changing circumstances."216 Even very ambiguous
language can be valuable in documents such as constitutions
which are meant to be flexible. This is especially so where the

213. Id.

214.

at 39.

Id.

215. DOP Article V, reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 318.
21 6.

B I LDER, supra

note 1 1 9, at 119.
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authority to interpret and reinterpret the document is definitively
vested in a specific institution, such as a supreme court.
Mute Domestic Opposition: "Domestically," notes Kleiman,
constructive ambiguity "avoids confronting one's opponents at
home and being charged with weakness, with capitulation or with
betraying the cause. "217
B.

The Risks of Ambiguity

The benefits of reliance on "constructive ambiguity" are accompa
nied by various risks, including the following:
• Harder to Hold Party to Less Clear Commitment: Generally
speaking, the more vaguely a commitment is phrased, the harder
it is to hold a party to it. If a nation "believes that its obligation is
ambiguous or uncertain," says Bilder, "it will see itself as in a
better position to justify or excuse nonperformance or inadequate
performance and to resist any application of sanctions."21 8 Vaguer
texts are more open to what Franck calls "self-serving exculpa
tory definitions. "219 A party ·can more readily deny that a particu
lar action constituted a violation of a vaguely phrased commit
ment, and know that the uncertainty as to the violated
commitment's meaning may reduce the responses to the viola
tion.220 Bilder therefore recommends that a nation which is con
cerned that another nation will not adequately perform its obliga
tions under an agreement should "seek to describe the
performance expected of the other nation as clearly and precisely
as possible in the agreement."221 For this reason, say Chayes and
Chayes, the United States has in the arms control field "opted for
increasingly detailed agreements, on the ground that they reduce
interpretive leeway."222 They note that the Strategic Arms Reduc
tion Treaty signed in 1989 "is the size of a telephone book."223
• Creates False Sense that Issue Is Resolved: Professor Bilder cau
tions that using constructively ambiguous language to paper over
a failure to reach agreement on a particular issue can "relax the
pressure on the parties to reach an agreement capable of really
dealing with the problem involved, induce false public expecta217. KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 137.
218. BILDER, supra note 1 19, at 118.
219. FRANCK, supra note 59, at 57.
220. HENKIN, supra note 40, at 70.
221 . BILDER, supra note 1 19, at 1 18.
222. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 80, at 1 1 .
223. Id.
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tions, and, when these expectations are disappointed, lead to
increased conflict and more difficulty in reaching real agree
ment. "224
Fosters False Sense of What Has Been Gained and Conceded:
Including ambiguous language in an agreement can foster not
only a false sense that an issue is no longer of concern because it
has been resolved; it can also foster dangerous misconceptions of
what has been gained or conceded in an agreement. Professor
Kleiman speaks disparagingly of "ambiguity's employment as a
tool for deception in domestic politics, where it leads an un
knowing public to believe hard commitments have been extracted
from the enemy in return for soft concessions, or none at
all . . . . "225 Such a deception of a party's own domestic public is, of
course, particularly pronounced when ambiguous language in the
agreement is given a more specific meaning elsewhere, such as in
a secret side letter.
Increases Dependence on Third Party: Using constructively
ambiguous language to paper over failures to reach agreement
can increase dependence on a third-party "honest broker" who
becomes "indispensable" both for "stepping forward with vacu
ous but face-saving terminology"226 and for helping the parties re
solve subsequent disputes over the meaning of the ambiguous
language.
Sets Stage for Later Disagreement Between Parties: Professor
Kleiman uses particularly strong language to warn of the danger
of "deferred confrontation. "227 He contends that "by leaving core
values, issues or interests vague and unsettled," the use of am
biguous language with respect to central issues "is guaranteed to
be the source for later difficulties."228 This danger is particularly
pronounced where relations become so bad that parties try to
stretch interpretations of ambiguous language recklessly far in fa
vor of their own interests.
Feeds Disrespect for the Agreement: Because human beings have
a tendency to generalize from the particular to the whole, using
ambiguous language to paper over disagreements in one area can
risk undermining the legitimacy of other parts of the agreement.
Parties that get in the habit of stretching ambiguous provisions
may start trying to stretch clearer provisions. Commentators and

224. BILDER, supra note 1 19, at 38-39.
225. KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 20.
226. Id. at 137.
227. Id. at 37.
228. Id. at 54-55.
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other citizens who become aware of particular holes in an agree
ment may begin to assume the entire agreement is riddled with
holes. As Louis Henkin notes of another peace agreement, "any
doubt cast on the legal validity of any of the provisions would cast
doubt on the whole. "229 Professor Kleiman writes, in his analysis
of ambiguity in the Oslo Accords, that " (t]he idea that Arab
Jewish understanding might be promoted by willfully perpetuat
ing misunderstanding defies logic."230 " (W]here," he asks, "do ar
tifice and deception in treaty drafting leave reconciliation in the
deeper sense of a true meeting of the minds?"231 "How," he con
tinues, "can intentional ambiguity be reconciled with calls for
transparency, candor and commitment in international rela
tions?"232
It is worth noting that the use of ambiguity can create confusion,
not only between the parties and amongst their respective publics, but
in the minds of the negotiators as well. George Orwell warned of the
danger in his 1946 essay entitled "Politics and the English Language."
Orwell warned that the use of "euphemism, question-begging and
sheer cloudy vagueness" is dangerous in part because it "anaesthetizes
a portion of one's brain." Vagueness, said Orwell, is a "continuous
temptation, a packet of aspirins always at one's elbow," which is
surrendered to at the cost of creating confusion, "not only for your
reader but for yourself."233
If many of the words and phrases in the Accords, and especially
the seminal DOP, seem ambiguous to international law experts like
Watson and others assessing them at their leisure in the light of expe
rience and with vast scholarly resources at hand, there was surely
enormous opportunity for the Palestinian negotiating team at Oslo to
be either unclear or mistaken as to the agreement's meaning. Joel
Singer, an experienced international lawyer, arrived in Oslo partway
through the negotiations to join the Israeli delegation as their legal
adviser. The Palestinian delegation chose not to have a legal adviser
on their negotiating team. In his book Through Secret Channels,
Mahmoud Abbas ("Abu Mazen"), the senior PLO leader who signed
the DOP on behalf of the Palestinians, writes as follows:
I must admit that throughout the Oslo negotiations we 'did not review the
texts with a legal consultant for fear of leaks. . . . I tried to make use of

229.

HENKIN, supra

note 40, at 80.

230.

KLEIMAN, supra

note 22, at 136.

231. Id. at 117.
232. Id.
233. GEORGE ORWELL, POLITICS AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1946),
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/orwell46.htm (last visited Sept. 1 1 , 2003).
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the remnants of the legal knowledge I had acquired while studying law at
Damascus University, but I could not draw much comfort from them.234

Only "when all the outstanding points of difference had been resolved
and it had been agreed to meet in Oslo to initial the DOP" did Abbas
summon the PLO's legal consultant, Taber Shash, from Cairo.235 Shash
arrived in Oslo and "was met by Abu Ala who handed him the text of
the DOP and asked him to review it and give his opinion. Shash
studied it thoroughly, and a few hours later informed Abu Ala that it
was a good text with no shortcomings."236 Shash then returned to
Cairo. A few hours later, the DOP was initialed in Oslo.237
C.

A Case Study of Ambiguity in the Oslo Accords: The Palestinian
Charter Issue

A prototypical example of the Accords' disastrously counterpro
ductive reliance on ambiguity involves the protracted effort to achieve
deletion from the Palestinian National Charter (also known as the
"Palestinian Covenant") ("PNC" or "Charter") of various objection
able clauses, including several Charter clauses calling for the destruc
tion of Israel.
Yossi Ben-Aharon, former Director General of the Israeli Foreign
Ministry, opines in Lessons of Failure that " [s]ome 25 out of 33 articles
of that covenant" call "for the elimination of Israel. "23 8 Several
Charter articles stand out as particularly inconsistent with the DOP.
For example, Article 15 of the Charter states that "The liberation of
Palestine . . . aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine� "239 Arti
cle 19 of the Charter states that " [t]he partition of Palestine in 1947,
and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regard
less of the passage of time. "240 Article 20 of the Charter states that
"[c]laims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are
incompatible with the facts of history."241 Article 21 of the Charter
states: "The Arab Palestinian people . . . reject all solutions which are
substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine." Article 22 of the

234. MAHMOUD ABBAS, THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS 162 (1995).
235. ld. at 178-79.
236. Id. at 179.
237. Id. at 162.
238. Yossi Ben-Aharon, supra note 144, at 60.
239. Palestine
National
. Charter
(1968),
available at http://www.palestine
un.org/plo/frindex.html and http://www.palestine-net.com/politics (last visited Sept. 1 1 ,
2003).
240. Id.
24 1 . Id.
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Charter states that the "liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist
and imperialist presence: "242
Procedures amending the Charter are specified in Article 33, which
provides as follows: , "This Charter shall not be amended save by a
majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Council
of the Palestine Liberation Organization at a special session convened
for that purpose."243
At Oslo, the Israeli delegation insisted that the Palestinian side
agree to eliminate those portions of the Charter that call for the de
struction of the state of Israel. Yasser Arafat, in his capacity as
Chairman of the PLO, responded to this request in his letter of
September 9, 1993, to Prime Minister Rabin. Arafat first stated that
"The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace
and security." Then, at the end of the letter, he stated:
[T]he PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which
deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are
inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and
no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the
Palestinian National Council for formal approval the· necessary changes
in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.244

Arafat's statement contains several ambiguities, including:
1) Which specific provisions are included in his reference to "those
articles . . . which deny Israel's right to exist" and "the provisions . . . which are inconsistent with the commitments of" the letter? No list of affected provisions was provided.
2) What exactly are the "necessary changes" in regard to the
Charter? No new draft or list of necessary changes was provided.
3) Since the Charter, by its own terms, cannot be amended except by
a two-thirds vote of the PNC, what is the legal significance of an
Arafat letter stating that the PLO "affirms" that certain articles
"are now inoperative and no longer valid"?
4) What is the legal significance of the rather loose formulation that
"the PLO undertakes to submit" the necessary changes to the
PNC? It is not hard to imagine alternative formulations that
would have provided much greater clarity. For example, "the
PLO will immediately submit" would have bound the time within
which the commitment was to be carried out. An addition to the
end of the second sentence of a phrase like "and will take all nec
essary steps to advocate for and secure such approval" would

242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Letter from Arafat to Rabin (Sept. 9, 1 993), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at
315.
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have committed the PLO to doing more than simply submitting
the necessary changes.
5) What is the meaning of Arafat's reference to "formal approval"
by the PNC of "the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian
Covenant"? Again, it is not hard to imagine on alternative for
mulation that would have provided much greater clarity. For ex
ample, Arafat's letter could have referred to "formal amendment
of the Covenant by a 2/3 vote of the Council so that a new Cove
nant text is created which no longer contains the specified provi
sions which deny Israel's right to exist or which are inconsistent
with the commitments of this letter."
The ambiguously worded Charter commitment in Arafat's Sep
tember 9, 1993, letter turned out to be the first step in a game, of
which Abbott and Costello would have been proud, that went as
follows: 1) the Palestinians would claim to have performed their
Charter-revision obligation, then 2) the Israelis would claim that the
Palestinian act in question had not satisfied the obligation, then 3) the
parties would agree on a revised but still ambiguous expression of the
Palestinian commitment, followed by 1) then 2) then 3) and then 1)
again and so fo rth. At each stage, the Palestinians would claim that the
newly agreed formulation was the most to which they could commit.
Some have posited that the Israelis may, at times, not have pushed as
hard as they might have for a new Charter text out of concern that it
might end up containing newly offensive, but perhaps harder to object
to, provisions such as a declaration of Jerusalem as the future capital
of Palestine. Whatever benefits the parties hoped to gain from the
ambiguities they agreed to, the net effect was to make a mockery of
the Oslo process and the Accords.
" [L]ittle progress was made towards amending the" Charter during
the two years following the signing of the DOP.245 In response to
Israeli dissatisfaction with this lack of progress, a new version of the
Charter-revision obligation was agreed to and included at Article
XXXI(9) of the Interim Agreement, which was signed in Washington
on September 28, 1995.246 Unfortunately, this new provision also left
unclear which specific provisions were to be changed, what "changes"
to those provisions were deemed "necessary," and what the mecha
nism would be for implementing the changes.
By January 1996, reports Watson, Arafat - notwithstanding his
letter to Rabin and Article XXXI(9) - "was taking the position that
the Covenant did not need to be amended because the PNC had
already made declarations in 1988 and 1991 recognizing Israel's right
245.

WATSON, supra note 8, at 204.

246. See Article XXXI of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and Gaza Strip (Sept. 28, 1 995) , reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8, at 366.
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to exist and renouncing terrorism."247 In other words, Arafat was say
ing that no "changes" were in fact "necessary." In March 1996, how
ever, the Palestinians released a new draft Palestinian Charter con
taining conciliatory language that at least arguably removed the
offending passages. 248
The PNC met, for the first time in five years, in April 1996. It did
not, however, adopt the March 1996 draft language, or indeed any new
Charter language. Instead, it passed a resolution, on April 25, 1996, in
which the PNC decided:
l) The Palestinian National Charter is hereby amended by canceling
the articles that are contrary to the letters exchanged by the
P.L.O. and the Government of Israel 9-10 September 1993.
2) Assigns its legal committee with the task of redrafting the
Palestinian National Charter in order to present it to the first ses
sion of the Palestinian central council.249
This resolution neither created a new Charter text nor specified
which articles were cancelled. It also did not clearly describe the proc
ess by which a new Charter text would come into force. The ambiguity
left many questions unresolved. For example, was the resolution
understood to have given the legal committee a blank check to create
a new Charter text that would come into force upon presentation to
the first session of the Palestinian Central Council? Or would the PNC
need to reconvene to approve the new Charter text? What would the
Charter look like in the meantime? How would people know which
articles had or had not been cancelled?
As it happened, the legal committee's six-month deadline for com
pleting a redrafted Charter "came and went."250 Benjamin Netanyahu
succeeded Shimon Peres as Prime Minister of Israel and his new gov
ernment "sought a renewed, more definite Palestinian commitment to
amend" the Charter.251 Accordingly, the Note for the Record prepared
in conjunction with the Hebron Protocol, which was signed on January
15, 1997, contained yet another phrasing of the Charter obligation.252
According to Watson, "this language still contained some ambigu
ity,"253 and by autumn 1998 there was still no new Charter. And so, at
the Netanyahu government's request, the following provision was
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included at Article II.C.2. of the Wye River Memorandum, which was
signed on October 23, 1998:
PLO Charter
The Executive Committee of the ·Palestine Liberation Organization and
the Palestinian Central Council will reaffirm the letter of 22 January 1998
from PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to President Clinton concerning the
nullification of the Palestinian National Charter provisions that are
inconsistent with the letters exchanged between the PLO and the
Government of Israel on 9/10 September 1993. PLO Chairman Arafat,
the Speaker of the Palestine National Council, and the Speaker of the
Palestinian Council will invite the members of the PNC, as well as the
members of the Central Council, the Council, and the Palestinian Heads
of Ministries to a meeting to be addressed by President Clinton to reaf
firm their support for the peace process and the aforementioned deci
sions of the Executive Committee and the Central Council.254

"On returning home [from Wye], Netanyahu cited the above pro
vision as one of the main successes of Israeli diplomacy."255 But the
wording of the provision is in fact "singularly nebulous. "256 Kleiman
notes that "[t]here is no explicit proviso for the PNC body as such to
reconvene formally."257 Rather, members of the PNC were to be
among the invitees to a meeting where those present would be asked
to "reaffirm their support" for Executive Committee and Central
Council decisions reaffirming the January 22, 1998, letter from Arafat
to Clinton. There is provision neither for a majority vote of two-thirds
of the members of the PNC nor for publication of an amended
Charter text.
President Clinton participated in a meeting on December 14, 1998,
in Gaza, "attended by about 500 of an estimated 650 members of the
Palestine National Council," at which a vote was taken, by show of
hands, "in support of Mr. Arafat's decision to amend the charter. "258
The next day, Prime Minister Netanyahu pronounced himself satis
fied.259 In reporting the event, the New York Times mentioned the
April 1996 meeting at which the PNC had addressed the issue of the
offending Charter clauses. The Times noted that in insisting on the
insufficiency of the April 1 996 proceedings, "the Israelis [had] pointed

254. The Wye River Memorandum (Oct. 23. 1998), reprinted in WATSON, supra note 8,
at 380.
255. KLEIMAN, supra note 22, at 121.
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258. Deborah Sontag, Clinton Watches as Palestinians Drop Call for Israel's Destruction,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1 998, at Al .
259. See Deborah Sontag, Israel Won 't Meet Friday Timetable for Next Pullout, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, Al.
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to the continued inclusion of the clauses in copies of the charter."260
Unfortunately, as of March 2003, the only copies of the Charter which
were available (at least in English) on official PA websites still con
tained every single one of the offending clauses. After all the laboring
over every jot and tittle of at least five different ambiguous expres
sions of commitment, the process has apparently still not been com
pleted.
Indeed, on February 1, 2001, "one hundred Palestinian personali
ties, including members of the Palestinian Authority's Executive
Council and members of the PNC, met in Cairo under the
chairmanship of the Speaker of the PN<;:."261 Among the resolutions
they passed was one that maintained that the historical Palestinian
Charter "was still in force, because the PNC had not been convened
for the purpose of approving changes in the Covenant and, especially,
since the legal committee that should prepare the changes had not
been set up."262
.
This game, played out . for all the world to see, of writing and
rewriting this same basic commitment, which has still not been com
pletely carried out, has wasted precious peacemaking energy.
Dragging out this simple matter has also fed cynicism about the
Accords and cast a shadow over the Oslo process, causing Israelis to
doubt the Palestinian commitment to peace and fostering Palestinian
anxieties about Israeli micromanagement of their internal processes.
Although the Charter squabble has been a particularly egregious ex
ample of destructive ambiguity, it is far from the only one. Ambiguous
language has sent the Israelis and Palestinians round and round about
Palestinian security commitments,263 the scope _and pace of Israeli re
deployments,264 the permissibility of Israeli settlement building,265 and
the meaning of Palestinian "safe passage" between the West Bank and
Gaza Strip,266 among other issues. In the meantime, relatively little
negotiating time was spent, and relatively little progress was made, on
central, substantive permanent-status issues such as Jerusalem and
refugees.
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CONCLUSION

This Review's analysis of the Oslo Accords and their failures
reveals important lessons about what in a bilateral peace agreement's
text can maximize, and what can diminish, the likelihood that the par
ties will comply with the agreement's terms. Building on Lessons of
Failure, Oslo & International Law, and Breakthrough, this analysis
makes clear that the Oslo process and texts failed to take advantage of
many of the most valuable contributions that international law can
make to successful peace negotiations.
Some of these potential contributions were largely or entirely
inapplicable to Oslo because of the particular characteristics of the
parties, their histories, and their conflict. But many compliance
maximizing tools could have been more usefully employed in the Oslo
process and Accords. The failure to take advantage of these tools
meant the Accords were, from the beginning, weaker than they could
have been. That congenital weakness was compounded by the parties'
heavy reliance on two methodological pillars - "open-ended gradu
alism" and "constructive ambiguity" - that proved to be disastrously
counterproductive.
Notwithstanding the understandable skepticism of some observers,
this Review posits that international Jaw and international agreements
- properly deployed - can serve as useful tools for resolving con
flicts even in many of the darkest recesses of the international jungle.
For example, international law offers numerous formal mecha
nisms for resolving disputes between the parties to an agreement. The
Oslo Accords specified several such mechanisms as options to which
the parties could turn in case of disagreement. Other provisions of the
Accords required the parties to avail themselves of specific dispute
resolution mechanisms in certain circumstances. But in dispute after
dispute, the PA/PLO and Israel ignored both the optional mechanisms
and the required mechanisms.
International law supplies norms that can provide a useful starting
point for, and place outer limits on, a peace negotiation and resulting
agreement. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, some rele
vant norms were too indeterminate to be of use, and some specific
disputes were too freighted with emotion to be resolved through
anything other than negotiation. But the Accords would have met with
more success if Yasser Arafat, in particular, had adhered to the inter
national legal norm of interpreting and performing obligations in good
faith.
International law also offers several means of increasing the likeli
hood of compliance with agreements - both interim and permanent
- by lending legitimacy to the process and the texts. Legitimacy, the
factor which noncoercively encourages compliance with rules, is
accorded in greater measure to agreements that are legally binding
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than to those that are nonbinding. The Accords were legally binding,
but not indisputably so. It is possible that the lack of clarity on this
point may have undermined compliance.
Another compliance-maximizing factor is the phenomenon of par
ties choosing to obey a rule, despite the fact that violating it would
bring certain short-term gains, because they expect that their long
term benefits from the future operation of the same norm will out
weigh the short-term gains. This phenomenon was inevitably less
applicable to the Oslo Accords because of the characteristics of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike with many international agree
ments, the obligations which the two parties undertook in the Oslo
Accords needed in many cases to be very different. But there seems to
have been little or no conscious effort to maximize the similarity of
those obligations that could be made similar.
The Oslo Accords also could have, but did not, specify the costs or
consequences of violations. The lack of such provisions may have con
tributed to the Accords' failure to deter violations. The Oslo Accords
also failed to foster the creation of vested material interests in compli
ance. Economic interests, which could have been given more attention
in the Accords, were instead treated as an afterthought.
· Even though almost all recent scholarship on compliance with
international law has been focused on multilateral agreements (and
particularly those which are nonbinding), some of the theories that
have emerged from this literature can also be useful for promoting
compliance with bilateral peace agreements. For example, some
scholars have identified a belief in the long-term benefits of participa
tion in the international community as a motivating force for compli
ance. The Oslo Accords might have derived greater benefit from this
principle if the parties, which had been relatively isolated from - and
thus were skeptical of - the international community, had been ad
vised of specific international communal benefits they would receive
following a resolution of their conflict.
Instead of finding ways to benefit from the aforementioned com
pliance-maximizing tools, the framers of the Oslo Accords relied
heavily on "open-ended gradualism" and "constructive ambiguity" in
crafting their agreements. The logic behind "open-ended gradualism"
was to defer issues that were hard to resolve in the hope that gradually
intensifying cooperation between the two sides, and progressively
increasing the concessions of each to the other, would build sufficient
trust to enable later compromises.
But the Accords' open-endedness as to final status arrangements
enabled both sides' leaders to create dangerous expectations by
promising their people unattainable results, fed each party's concerns
about the other's good faith, deprived both sides' leaders of a vision of
the future to sell to their people, left the process hostage to extremists,
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and encouraged the parties to unilaterally improve their positions on
the ground for the final negotiations.
Gradualism meant almost continual negotiations. These diverted
policy analysis resources from permanent-status issues to incremental
changes, and created business-sapping uncertainty. Public skepticism
was increased by minor interim agreements that seemed to change
nothing, friction between the two leaderships was fed by missed
deadlines, and changing obligations meant the Accords were unable to
benefit from the compliance-promoting efficiencies of routinization.
The Oslo framers' extensive reliance on "constructive ambiguity"
to paper over differences also seemed to create more problems than it
solved. For example, it induced false public expectations as to what
had been resolved and fostered dangerous misconceptions as to what
had been gained or conceded. Tensions caused by ambiguity in certain
areas (such as Charter revision) wasted valuable negotiating energy
and undermined the perceived legitimacy of the agreement as a whole.
It is impossible to say whether an improved Oslo process and texts
would have brought peace. But it seems likely that agreements which
made better use of the aforementioned compliance-maximizing tools
would have had a stronger claim to legitimacy and therefore would
have less quickly lost their ability to inspire compliance. International
law's potential contributions to international agreements, including
peace agreements, are just that, potential. They must be consciously
harnessed. There has been very little discussion in either legal scholar
ship or the policy community of what in a bilateral peace agreement
text can maximize, and what can diminish, the likelihood that the par
ties will comply with the agreement's terms. The Oslo Accords have
thus far bought more process than peace. Many other intranational
conflicts also remain unresolved, with a bloody trail of failed peace
agreements left in their wake. If paper is going to serve as a worthy al
ternative to power in the international arena, much more attention
must be given to the art of crafting a peace agreement so as to maxi
mize the likelihood that the parties to it will comply with its terms.

